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The history of modern Syria is often divided into brief periods, relating to a 
specific topic, such as authoritarianism in the early years of independence, the emergence 
of nationalism after the end of World War I, and so on. This thesis is the end result of a 
careful reading and application of two particular assertions made by the late Albert 
Hourani, specifically that, as historians, we often divide up the past into somewhat 
perilous periodisiations; and that even if there were no ‘Syrian’ people, the Syrian lands 
would still be ripe with problems. Thus, this thesis examines the effects of rule by non-
Syrians, then traces these effects through the first thirty years of independence. These 
‘non-Syrians,’ especially the French, made several broken promises, which led to a very 
specific desire to see Syria ruled by Syrians. While the rule of the various military 
governments and their successors from 1946-1969 was by no means free of strife, it 
could be argued that by 1970 the only option for any semblance of security and stability 
was the authoritarian rule of Hafiz al-Asad. The present work is an attempt to break up 
the periodisations to show that indeed, whether under French or Ottoman control, Syrian 
politics were problematic, and, unfortunately, a precursor to the repressive regime that 
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To ensure simplicity, I have rendered Arabic and Turkish names and words into 
familiar forms. Though commonly spelled Feisal and Hussein, I use Faysal and Husayn 
and less common words and translations into Arabic have been italicized. Translations 
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The late Albert Hourani once wrote that “It is a commonplace that we cut up 
history into periods at our peril: the artificial frontiers made for convenience may seem to 
be real, and a new generation of historians will have to spend time removing them.”1 He 
goes on to explain that even though they can be “perilous,” these divisions do in fact aid 
historians in their attempts to reconstruct the past: “Nevertheless, to think we must 
distinguish, and the best we can do is to try to make divisions which reveal something 
important about the process we are studying.”2 Though they do aid historians in their 
attempts to understand the past, they are far less useful for anyone attempting to explore 
the nature of power and authority in the region of Bilad al-Sham, or Greater Syria, from 
the Ottoman Empire to the present state of affairs. The common divisions, ‘Late-Ottoman 
Syria,’ ‘Faysal’s Syria,’ ‘Mandate Syria,’ ‘post-Mandate Syria,’ and finally ‘modern 
Syria,’ seem to imply that there is no historical connection between these periods and that 
marked historical divisions are a natural occurrence. This assertion could not be farther 
from the truth. No matter who has been at the top of Syrian politics, the Sultan or the 
French High Commissioner, there exists a commonality among all forms of government. 
                                                
1 Albert Hourani, ‘Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables,’ William Polk and Richard Chambers, 
Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1968), 41. 
2 Ibid. 
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This is the fact that, despite experiments with and the implementation of ideas of 
‘democracy’ or ‘popular sovereignty,’ power has always remained in the hands of a very 
select few individuals, and at times, most notably since 1970, in the hands of a single 
individual.  
Surely classifying the French Mandate as authoritarian would be a historical error, 
but there are surprising similarities in the ways the French and the Asad regime(s), as 
well as the late-Ottoman rulers and the countless governments between 1946-1970, 
sought to reign in control over their ‘subjects.’ As Hourani has also argued,  “Even if 
there were no Syrian people a Syrian problem would still exist. Syria owes its political 
importance less to the qualities of its population than to its geographical position.”3 This 
quote, while distinctly referring to the Syrians themselves, can also be utilized in a 
different context, one that looks at who is at the top of the Syrian political hierarchy. 
Thus this thesis is an attempt to break down the barriers that exist between the periods of 
Syria’s recent history in an attempt to show that, despite the difficulties associated with 
trying to describe some one 180 years of history with a single phrase, there have been 
noticeable historical currents in Syrian history, especially as they relate to the concept of 
authority and power. 
It is commonplace and well accepted to assert that modern Syria cannot be fully 
understood without some probing into its recent history. Often, however, works on Syria 
relegate these historical analyses to introductory chapters, while the bulk of the work is 
related to the specific period in question. This work is by no means a definitive study, and 
due to its length will focus on a specific selection of events throughout the last century 
and a half of Syrian history. As Hourani asserts in Syria and Lebanon, before Syria’s 
                                                
3 Albert Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 6. 
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more recent history can be understood, one must attempt to understand how Syria arrived 
in the twenty-first century (or, in his case, the twentieth). Thus, this thesis will begin with 
a brief explanation of Syria under the late Ottoman Empire; it will then move to Syria’s 
position in World War I and the French Mandate; and conclude with an analysis of 
‘modern’ Syria, specifically from independence in 1946 to the late twentieth century and 
the chaotic political history of this time period.  
 It is perhaps not quite accurate to label French administration in Syria from 1922-
1946 as ‘authoritarian,’ as the term itself carries several connotations that are not easily 
applied to the French colonial system, although it is true that the French seem to have had 
a somewhat limited understanding of the principle that the mandate was an essentially 
temporary and transitional arrangement, though one is hard-pressed to deny the lasting 
impact and the moral implications of the concept of Mission Civilasatrice. From their 
writings it is clear that most French officials shared the notion that they were taking part 
in a ‘civilizing mission’ of some kind. What many of them failed to realize, however, was 
that however backward it may have seemed to the colonizers, Syria was in fact a country 
with a rich historical tradition, dating back to the earliest years of Islam. Damascus and 
Aleppo, two of the major cities of Syria, are among the oldest continuously inhabited 
cities in the world, and remain vibrant cultural centers to this day. Current events in the 
Middle East, including the recent uprisings in Syria, have redirected attention to the 
authoritarian nature of the postcolonial states of the Middle East. Saddam Husayn, ousted 
from Iraq in 2003, was a brutal and cruel dictator, but he was by no means the only one. 
The rule of Hafiz al-Asad in Syria from 1970 to his death in 2000 was characterized by 
brutal repression and the development of an expansive network of control and 
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domination. His son, Bashar, is now facing what are evidently the most serious threats to 
the regime since the Hama uprisings in 1982.  
What, then, is the purpose of this thesis? In the following pages, I hope to 
elaborate on the idea that periodisations, especially in this case, are indeed perilous and 
often can lead to the false understanding that natural historical boundaries exist 
throughout Syrian history. Obviously Ottoman Syria was quite different from Mandate 
Syria, but it is historically inaccurate to view them as two entirely different historical 
entities. The French Mandate authorities inherited a new country, which had previously 
been part of the vast Ottoman Empire, and therefore they had to deal with a pre-existing 
social and political structure. On the other side, while there was a concentrated effort to 
get rid of the French, especially during the last years of the Mandate, French culture and 
politics had a significant impact on Syria in the mid-twentieth century.4 Essentially, 
French imperialism in Syria, itself a form of authoritarianism by a different name, has to 
be seen as part of a continuous process of political developments that began with the 
imposition of the Tanzimat reforms by the Ottoman government in 1839. 
 
Literature Review 
As mentioned, this is by no means a definitive study, but rather a springboard for 
further research into authoritarianism in the history of Syria. There have been numerous 
works on this subject within Syrian historiography, perhaps most notably Lisa Wedeen’s 
Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric and Symbols in Contemporary Syria, 
Nikolaos Van Dam’s The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad 
                                                
4 For an excellent analysis of how Syrians, mostly Aleppines, sought to assert and ascertain their own 
identities under the Mandate, see Keith Watenpaugh, Being Modern in the Middle East: Revolution, 
Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Arab Middle Class (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2006). 
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and the Ba‘th Party, Steven Heydemann’s Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and 
Social Conflict, 1946-1970, and Raymond Hinnebusch’s Syria: Revolution from Above.5 
Literature on the French Mandate is just as plentiful, and the landmark work of Philip 
Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945 is 
unparalleled in its archival sources and attention to detail. Elizabeth Thompson’s 
Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria 
and Lebanon is yet another significant contribution to the field, as Thompson 
disentangles the complicated web of cooperation and competition among mass-
movements in a nuanced historical analysis. Of perhaps unparalleled quality is her 
analysis of the part played by gender under the French Mandate. Michael Provence’s The 
Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab Nationalism is an invaluable study of the first 
major uprising against French Mandate authority and its impact on Syrian and Arab 
nationalist thought.  
Finally, the works of Abdul Karim-Rafeq, which are too numerous to list, need to 
be mentioned for their significant contribution to the study of Syria under the Ottoman 
Empire.6 A recent volume, edited by Peter Sluglett and Stefan Weber, contains several 
original pieces on the state of Syria, and Bilad al-Sham, under the Ottomans.7 A 
significant amount of attention has been paid to the literature on French imperialism, and 
a conscious effort has been made to ascertain the French perspective on this matter. For 
that, there is perhaps no better source than a brief article written by General Gouraud, ‘La 
                                                
5 See bibliography for complete references. 
6 See, for example, The Province of Damascus 
7 Here it should be clarified what exactly the term ‘Syria’ refers to. In this study, ‘Syria’ will refer to the 
geographical area created after World War I with its present boundaries. When referring to ‘historical’ 
Syria, the region extending from the Tauris Mountains south to Sinai and from the Mediterranean east to 
Northern Mesopotamia and the eastern Syrian Desert, the terms ‘historical Syria’ and Bilad al-Sham will be 
used interchangeably. 
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France en Syrie,’ which was published in 1922 in Revue de France. Furthermore, works 
by Hourani, Henri Brunschwig, Peter Shambrook, Christopher Andrew and A.S. Kanya-
Forstner, Stephen Roberts, and William Shorrock all provide good starting points for 
excursions into the history of French colonial policy.8 As with any study of the nature of 
politics in Syria, Patrick Seale’s classic Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East, 




Inherent in any study of the outcomes of the mandate system imposed on the 
people of Greater Syria and the rest of the Arab Middle East after World War I is a study 
of Arab, perhaps in this case Syrian, nationalism. Thus, what follows is a brief 
explanation of the more common views on the emergence of nationalism in the Middle 
East. 
Albert Hourani argues that distinct modes of nationalism emerged in the Middle 
East around the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries.  One 
mode of nationalism was one closely associated with European nationalist movements, 
particularly the sense of community and patriotism among all those who inhabited the 
same piece of land. This mode, as Hourani argues, was particularly marked in regions of 
the Middle East where communities had inhabited the same definable areas over a 
                                                
8 See William I. Shorrock, French Imperialism in the Middle East: The Failure of Policy in Syria and 
Lebanon, 1900-1914 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976); Peter A. Shambrook, French 
Imperialism in Syria, 1927-1936 (Reading, UK: Garnett Publishing Ltd., 1999); Stephen H. Roberts, 
History of French Colonial Policy, 1870-1925 (London: P.S. King & Son, 1929); Christopher M. Andrew 
and A. S. Kanya-Forstner. The Climax of French Imperial Expansion, 1914-1924 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1981); Henri Brunschwig, Henri. French Colonialism, 1871-1914: Myths and Realities 
(New York, Washington and London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964). 
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significant amount of time such as Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Lebanon.9  Finally, 
Hourani points to what he considers the strongest mode of nationalism in the Middle 
East, ethnic and linguistic nationalism, which is based on the idea of the continuity of all 
who spoke the same language and live in the same space.  Furthermore, this new 
community professed the desire to form an independent political entity.10 This desire to 
form a new political entity was presented in several different ways. As will be discussed 
below, during the latter years of Ottoman rule in Syria, two distinct currents developed in 
early nationalist thought; those (relatively few) who sought complete independence for 
the Arab provinces from the Empire; and those who, noting the less desirable alternative 
of European control, expressed a desire to reinstitute constitutional rule, limit the powers 
of the Sultan, and ensure autonomy within the framework of the Empire for the 
provinces. 
Just as there were numerous provinces within the Arab regions of the Empire, so 
too were there divergent currents of Arab nationalism. Syrian nationalism centered 
around an insistence on the notion of Greater Syria, which had existed since the rise of 
Islam, playing a vital role in its spread dating to the presence of the Umayyad Caliphate 
in Damascus. There was also a distinct brand of Lebanese nationalism, principally 
espoused by the Maronites, who appealed to their ‘Phoenician heritage’ as a basis for 
national unity and independence. Egyptian nationalism, perhaps best personified by Sa‘d 
Zaghlul, insisted that the British leave Egypt, which they had occupied in 1882, and leave 
                                                
9 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798-1939 (London and New York: Oxford 
University Press), 342. 
10 Ibid. For a discussion of some early of Syrian ‘nationalist’ groups, see pp. 26-27 below. 
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Egypt for the Egyptians.11 Furthermore, despite its later association with the Ba‘th party, 
Iraqi nationalism, to a certain extent, carried with it overtones of its historical connection 
to the greatness characterized by Babylon, as immortalized by Saddam Husayn’s 
obsession with Nebuchadnezzar.12 
Ethnic and linguistic nationalism is found throughout the work of Sati‘ al-Husri.  
Husri argued in favor of the unification of all Arab lands, especially after the disastrous 
1948-49 war in Palestine.  To further his argument for the unification of Arab lands, 
Husri explained that the seven Arab states had lost the 1948-49 war in Palestine simply 
because they were seven separate states.13  Furthermore, he viewed the postwar states as 
“artificial creations of imperialist powers” meant to keep the Arabs politically, militarily, 
and culturally weak.14  Husri was by no means the only theorist of Arab nationalism, but 
he is certainly one of the most important writers on the subject.   
Husri’s ideas, and those of the founder of Ba‘thism, Michel ‘Aflaq, were heavily 
influenced by European, and especially German, political thought.  Husri advocated a 
universal and (Arab) state-run educational program that would emphasize a history that 
resonated with Arab nationalist thought.15  He also adopted a German definition of the 
term ‘nation’, maintaining that a nation should be based on the unity of a linguistic 
community and a coherent history, so that, regardless of an individual’s personal 
preferences, language and history determine national identity.16  Thus, for Husri, the Arab 
                                                
11 Selma Botman, Egypt From Independence to Revolution: 1919-1952 (Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 1991), 26-27. 
12 See Eric Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005). 
13 See Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press), 3. 
14 Ibid., 3. 
15 Ibid., 64. 
16 Ibid. 
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nation was predetermined and eternal, the basic tenets of primordialist thought on 
nationalism. Given the absurdity and the a-historical nature of such ideas it is surprising 
that they gained such wide acceptance.  
Discussing the importance of language to Arab nationalism, Husri explained that 
“language is the most important spiritual tie which binds an individual to the rest of 
mankind because it is the medium of communication amongst individuals.”17  He also 
explained the importance of history in the construction of the nation: “nationalist feeling 
depends on historical memories more than anything else” and has a “great impact on the 
direction of historical events….Love for independence is nourished by memories of the 
lost independence…faith in the future of the nation derives its strength from a belief in 
the brilliance of the past; and the longing for unification is increased by the renewal of 
memories of the past unity.”18  Thus, for Husri, Arabs were almost destined to unite 
under the banner of Arab nationalism simply because history told them to do so, which 
seems to show a certain ignorance of history, as the region had been neither united nor 
ruled by Arabs for several hundred years, certainly since well before the Ottoman period. 
The primordial sentiments that ran through the blood of every Arabic speaking individual 
would eventually unite all Arabs in the culmination of this grand narrative of a glorious 
past. 
Another proponent of Arab nationalism central to this examination is the Arab 
Socialist Renaissance Party, simply known as the Ba‘th Party.  Michel ‘Aflaq and Salah 
al-Din al-Bitar founded the party in the turbulent 1940s with an ideology based on its 
Syrian predecessors, The League of National Action, the National Arab Party, and the 
                                                
17 Quoted in Ibid., 66. 
18 Quoted in Ibid., 67. 
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Arab Socialist Party. Essentially, the ideals of all three parties were combined into the 
ideology of the Ba‘th Party.19 The founding members of these two groups outlined a four-
part ideology, specifically that the Arabs are one nation; the Arabs have one natural 
leader, a political-religious one; Arabism was a matter of national consciousness; and 
finally that the Arab “was the master of his own fate.”20 ‘Aflaq and Bitar adopted the 
basics of this ideology, specifically the idea that the Arabs formed a single nation that had 
been unlawfully divided, first by the Ottomans and then by the Western Powers in 1918, 
and advocated the idea that the mission of the Ba‘th Party was to “awaken the slumbering 
Arab nation and lead its unification.”21 While acknowledging that Islam was an important 
expression of Arab culture, the party propagated a secular ideology, and embraced an 
ideology designed to include all Arabic speakers from all religions.  More specifically, 
Ba‘thism combined Arab nationalism with a fervent populism that claimed to be 
profoundly hostile to the (existing) national order.22 Of course, while Ba‘thism was 
supposedly a pan-Arabist doctrine, party branches in the various Arab states soon 
acquired national labels, which partly explains the intense rivalry that would emerge 
between Ba‘thist Syria and Ba‘thist Iraq.23  
Ba‘thist ideology focused on the idea of inqilab (structural transformation or 
uprising), and ‘Aflaq explained how this transformation would come about: first, the 
nation must be aware of its historical and social conditions; second, moral character must 
be present; and third, Arabs must believe that destiny, history, and the “Arab condition” 
                                                
19 See John F. Devlin, ‘The Baath Party: Rise and Metamorphosis,’  The American Historical Review 96, 
no. 5 (Dec., 1991): 1396-1407. 
20 Robert W. Olson, The Ba‘th and Syria, 1947-1982, the Evolution of Ideology, Party, and State: From the 
French Mandate to the Era of Hafiz al-Asad (Princeton, NJ: Kingston Press, 1982), 3. 
21 Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 30. 
22 Ibid. 
23 See Eberhard Kienle, Ba‘th vs. Ba‘th: The Conflict Between Syria and Iraq 1968-1989 (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 1990). 
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must be ready for the success of inqilab.24  According to Ba‘thist ideology, after 
achieving inqilab, a nation would see the rise of the ‘trinity’ of Unity, Freedom, and 
Socialism.25  Along the lines of potential unification, ‘Aflaq and Ba‘th ideology (in a 
similar vein to Husri’s) considered the separate Arab states to be ‘regions’ of a larger 
Arab nation and (of course) ultimately as the consequence of imperialist aggression.  In a 
speech in 1957, ‘Aflaq stated that  
Our movement sees colonialism more as a result than as a cause, a result of 
whatever defects and distortions adulterate our society….The atmosphere created 
by previous movements…was a false atmosphere which concealed from the 
people the reality of the problem….They did not accept that the stage of our 
struggle against colonialism was connected to our struggle at home.  They did not 
understand…that the unification of the struggle was necessary, that the separation 
which had been imposed on our land was artificial and obstructive, and that in the 
hearts of the people…the falseness (of the separation) would disappear and…the 
fact that out nation was one would become apparent.26 
 
 Numerous recent studies have attempted to rewrite, or at the least reinterpret, the 
history of Arab nationalism, fixing its origins in popular sentiment rather than in the 
rarefied air of intellectual debate. Michael Provence has argued against the idea that 
nationalism in Syria, and the broader Middle East as well, was simply an extension of the 
politics of notables.27 For Provence, Arab nationalism was not the product of elite 
thinkers and politicians; there was no “smoke-filled room” like those of the “Damascene 
nationalist elite” that served as the origin of nationalist thought. Instead, local nonelites 
on the Syrian periphery “worked out for themselves what it meant to be part of a larger 
community. Eventually, in the Syrian case, the countryside came to lead the city in a 
                                                
24 Olson, 3-4. 
25 Ibid., 5. 
26 Quoted in Ibid., 9-10. 
27 This idea, found in The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab Nationalism, runs somewhat counter to 
Philip Khoury’s assertions in Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus 1860-1920. 
While the studies are based on different time periods, Khoury situates Arab nationalism “in the social and 
political environment” of Damascus at the turn of the twentieth century, mainly as a result of the actions of 
a “landowning-bureaucratic class” (p. 1). 
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display of national resistance against the French.”28 There is no denying that the 
nationalists of southern Syria, largely concentrated in Jabal Hawran, felt that they were 
part of a larger Syrian nation, and “articulated their ideas in view of local conditions and 
local experience.”29 As with all nationalisms, there were numerous currents of Syrian 
nationalism, yet, as Provence shows, each evolved in a ‘local’ context. They all desired 
an end to French control, and some became more prominent than others.30 Tracing the 
origins of a nationalist movement is a difficult endeavor. Often, ideologies are ‘hijacked’ 
by various groups who use them to their advantage. It could indeed be the case that Arab 
nationalism emerged out of the Great Syrian Revolt, but that would be to ignore the 
general dissatisfaction with French rule that had become painfully obvious within the first 
years of the Mandate.  
Particular attention must also be paid to the nature of authoritarianism, a term 
almost universally applied to the Syrian political structure since the end of the 1950s. It 
can be described as the consolidation of total power in the hands of a single person, or at 
most a very limited number of individuals. What engenders authoritarianism? In terms of 
political stability, few postcolonial states qualify as ‘strong states’; their political 
instability can be traced back to the top-down nature of the ‘colonial’ politics of (in this 
case) the mandate system.  This explains why in Syria, after the end of the mandate, there 
was a constant search for social and political identity throughout the various processes of 
state formation in the interwar years.  The upper echelons of the Syrian bourgeoisie failed 
                                                
28 Provence, Great Syrian Revolt, 48. 
29 Ibid. 
30 See ibid. A recent article by Steve Tamari posits the idea that Syrian, or Arab, national consciousness can 
be traced much further back than the early twentieth century, noting that scholars in the seventeenth century 
often referred to their home as bilad al-‘arab. See Steve Tamari, ‘Arab National Consciousness in 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Syria,’ in Peter Sluglett with Stefan Weber, eds., Syria and Bilad al-
Sham under Ottoman Rule: Essays in Honour of Abdul Karim Rafeq (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010),  
309-322. 
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to shoulder their “proper economic and political responsibilities,” which in turn helped 
bring about the various military coups mentioned above.31  Another result of the top-
down nature of mandate rule was the general sense of alienation and disenfranchisement 
shared by the growing middle class.32  Later, Asad would use this general alienation from 
politics to his advantage as he seized power in a ‘relatively’ peaceful coup.  This 
alienation and disenfranchisement could also be seen throughout the interwar years as the 
Syrian middle class looked anywhere and everywhere for social and political identity, 
some turning to fascism and others attempting at times to become French.33  Most 
Syrians were systematically excluded from the political process following World War I 
as they were mostly peasants who did not pay enough taxes to be qualified to vote.34  As 
a result, elections were usually rigged, and then often reduced to the simple formula of 
who-knows-who and how well.  In addition, most Syrians, for whatever reasons,35 were 
often removed from, and uninvolved with, the functions of state organizations and/or 
political institutions, and political parties failed to attract anything resembling a national 
following in the interwar period.36  All these processes made it nearly impossible for the 
formation of stable political and class identities,37 which in turn made Asad’s 
consolidation of power after 1970 significantly easier than it would have been had there 
                                                
31 Ibid., 98. 
32 Ibid. 
33 See Watenpaugh, Being Modern in the Middle East. 
34 Peter Sluglett, ‘The Ozymandias Syndrome: Questioning the Stability of Middle Eastern Regimes,’ in 
Oliver Schlumberger, ed. Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic 
Regimes (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 98. 
35 The French Mandate was still the effective ruling apparatus in Syria at this time, and thus the military 
rule and martial law ushered in by the Great Syrian Revolt in 1925 made the organization of substantial 
social and political organizations not explicitly approved by the French authorities difficult. One only need 
to look at the formation of the Ba‘th Party in 1947 to see the new ‘political freedom’ that came with the end 
of the Mandate, as Michel ‘Aflaq and Salah al-Bitar were able to coalesce the various Syrian socialist 
parties of the 1940s into a single cohesive, and therefore more powerful, group. 
36 Ibid., 98-99 
37 Ibid., 99. 
 14 
been a more evolutionary process of class formation and thus the development of 
political hierarchies. 
Another element of authoritarianism that needs to be mentioned is the prominent 
role played by the military. While the leaders of authoritarian regimes are not always 
career military men, they are often heads of the military and retain close personal 
relationships with the upper echelons of the armed forces.38 In the introduction to his 
classic study of the role of the military in politics, S.E. Finer called attention to the 
staggering number of independent states that suffered some sort of military intervention 
in their domestic politics.39  Even though it was published nearly fifty years ago, The 
Man on Horseback continues to provide valid theoretical insights into the nature of the 
relationship between armed forces and political structures.  Finer’s assertion that there is 
a distinct class of countries whose governments fall victim to military intervention is 
accurate, and as he says, such countries are sui generis.40  He differentiates military 
regimes from despotic, autocratic, and totalitarian regimes, noting that in the latter three, 
the military is often subordinated to the ruling civilian elite and rarely enjoys a prominent 
position in politics.   
                                                
38 Although many are or were: Hafiz al-Asad, ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, Husni Mubarak, and ‘Ali ‘Abdullah 
Salih, for example, it would be a stretch to assert that Bashar al-Asad was a career military man, seeing that 
after he returned from London after the death of his brother Basil, who was the ‘likely’ choice to step in 
when Hafiz passed away, he was quickly accelerated through Syria’s military hierarchy. 
39 See S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of The Military in Politics (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 
1976), specifically 1-3.  Between 1918 and the year of the first publication (1962) 26 states, all of which 
had been independent for over 100 years, suffered some sort of military intervention, see p. 2.  For a 
further, although perhaps outdated, discussion of the theoretical limitations of civil-military relations, see 
Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), esp. Ch. 1, ‘Officership as Profession’, which deals with 
career military officers and the ways in which military positions become careers rather than temporary 
appointments.  This fits nicely with Finer’s explanation of military organization, as hierarchical structures 
are often difficult to maintain with a constantly fluctuating staff of officers. 
40 Finer, 3. 
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Over time, the Syrian military became subordinated to the government, simply 
because it became absorbed into the state apparatus.  Furthermore, again echoing Finer, 
the military as an independent political force is a “distinct and peculiar phenomenon.”41  
The state of politics in the modern Middle East, however, often fails to generate a 
homogenous definition of the term ‘military regime’.  One of the important 
characteristics of the military is its organization, for, as Finer asserts, “Even the most 
poorly organized or maintained [army] is far more highly and tightly structured than any 
civilian group.”42  While chaotic disorganization may be characteristic of military 
structures in the contemporary Middle East, the extent of organization underlined by 
Finer is precisely what has allowed militaries to enter into the fore of politics in the past. 
What follows, then, is an attempt to remove the periodisations in the recent 
history of Syria alluded to by Hourani to show how, whether under Ottoman, French, or 
Syrian rule, the Syrian land has been subjected to numerous forms of authoritarian 
structures and military rule, even if the term ‘authoritarian’ is not always entirely 
applicable. To put it simply, Hafiz al-Asad may not have emerged as the authoritarian 
figure he was had France not instituted certain policies, notably the recruitment of 
members of ‘friendly’ minorities, which served to pave the way for the highly centralized 
and dictatorial nature of Syrian politics. This process, however, was not the only reason 
‘Alawis, and other minorities eventually emerged as the leading and most influential 
actors in the Syrian military. Furthermore, the French would likely have had a different 
experience had they paid attention to the initial struggles of the Ottomans to assert their 
                                                
41 Ibid., 4.  As will be discussed later, the militaries of Middle East states, while often instruments of 
regimes, are able to exercise a great deal of autonomy as long as they do not act in direct opposition to 
governmental policies. 
42 Ibid., 5.  Furthermore, he points to five specific characteristics of organization; centralized command, 
hierarchy, discipline, intercommunication, and a corresponding isolation and self-sufficiency, see 5-6. 
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authority over the population of Bilad al-Sham after the imposition of the Tanzimat and 











SYRIA AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
 
 
The Early History of  Bilad al-Sham 
 
According to Thomas Philipp, “Ever since the Muslim conquest, Bilad al-Sham 
was known as a distinct and important region, yet it never constituted an integrated legal 
or political entity on its own. Typically, it was either part, or even center, of a larger 
political entity or else it dissolved into a number or principalities, city-states etc.”1 
Philipp also notes that in the late seventeenth century Bilad al-Sham, unlike Egypt, was 
never regarded as a single political entity, but was rather divided up into the provinces of 
Aleppo, Damascus, Tripoli, and Sidon.  The Ottomans never combined the region of 
Bilad al-Sham into an official single entity, but administered it through a series of 
provincial governors and local administrators. The French, on the other hand, were eager 
to do so after the conclusion of World War I (and the British took Palestine and 
Transjordan).  
This is not to assert that Ottoman rule over Bilad al-Sham was without 
controversy and opposition.  In the introduction to his work on Ottoman rule in Syria, 
Dick Douwes quotes Muhammad al-Makki, a sheikh from Homs: “And they imposed a 
reign of injustice which was beyond description; even the rains stopped because of the 
                                                
1 Thomas Phillip, ‘Identities and Loyalties in Bilad al-Sham at the Beginning of the early Modern Period, in 
Thomas Philipp and Christoph Schumann, eds. From the Syrian Land to the States of Syria and Lebanon 
(Beirut: Ergon Verlag Würzburg, 2004), 10. 
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injustice done.”2 While the title of Douwes’ work may be somewhat misleading in its 
insistence on a ‘history’ of oppression, there were, nonetheless, numerous instances of 
calculated repression and coercion on behalf of the Ottoman government aimed at 
controlling the territories of Bilad al-Sham. 
 
Bilad al-Sham before the Tanzimat 
In 1609 the Ottoman Province of Damascus consisted of ten separate sanjaks, or 
administrative divisions: Damascus, Jerusalem, Gaza, Safad, Nablus, Ajlun, Lajjun, 
Tadmor, Sidon and Beirut, and finally Karak and Shawbak.3 The creation of these 
administrative units seems to have followed on the suppression of a revolt in Damascus, 
and was an attempt to create a more centralized, and hence efficient, government on 
behalf of the Ottomans in Istanbul. As Rafeq asserts, “[b]y establishing the administrative 
centres, the authorities could keep a closer watch over these diverse groups, insure the 
safety of the lines of communication with Egypt, and safeguard the passage of the 
Pilgrimage.”4 
 The Pilgrimage to Mecca, especially the importance of Damascus, deserves 
elaboration. According to Karl Barbir, the hajj “provided the Ottoman state with the 
annual opportunity to demonstrate its temporal authority, to show its colors, to assert its 
identity as the paramount Islamic state.”5 This attention to the annual pilgrimage required 
a significant amount of administrative support, and while it shared the spotlight with its 
Egyptian counterpart, the caravan leaving from Damascus garnered significant attention 
                                                
2 Dick Douwes, The Ottomans in Syria: A History of Justice and Oppression (London and New York: I.B. 
Tauris, 2000), 1. 
3 See Rafeq, The Province of Damascus, 1723-1783 (Beirut: Khayats, 1966), 1. 
4 Ibid., 2. 
5 Karl Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, 1708-1758 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 108. 
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from the Sublime Porte. One reason for the importance of Damascus to the Ottoman 
government was that many high ranking Ottoman officials, including members of the 
Sultan’s family, accompanied the pilgrimage through Damascus. Barbir elaborates on 
several themes of importance to the Ottoman government in relation to the pilgrimage 
from Damascus; first, a significant amount of tax revenue had to be raised to fund it, 
which at times led to some discord; second, there was a substantial increase in the 
production and distribution of food before, during, and after the journey; third, in order to 
protect the pilgrims from raids and other inconveniences, there was a significant network 
of fortresses and garrisons along the route; fourth, the caravan required a significant 
military escort, which did not come cheaply; and finally, another escort had to be 
provided for the caravan on its return to Damascus.6  
What then, does this say about Ottoman interests in Damascus? Throughout much 
of its history, local notables reported to and received instruction from the local Ottoman 
governors, who ultimately received their instruction from the Porte. The governors often 
faced numerous problems, as they faced pressure both from Istanbul and the local 
notables who, unlike themselves, were always there. There was a precarious balancing 
act in which these governors sought to carry out their orders while not upsetting those 
around them. Furthermore, the brevity of appointment for the governors, often no more 
than a few years, meant that they had little time to build up their own patronage networks, 
but rather had to incorporate the already existing framework into their administration. 
These local leaders were more than happy to cooperate in return for the prestige earned 
on both an individual and tribal level, in addition to receiving monetary compensation for 
                                                
6 For the brief explanation, see Barbir, 100, and 110-177 for explanations of the individual elements. Also 
see Rafeq, Province of Damascus, 59-76. 
 20 
their endeavors. Thus, the Ottoman government had to enforce its presence, or it faced 
numerous problems relating to the upkeep of the caravan from Damascus. To placate the 
local leaders, the administration of the pilgrimage was often handed to the governor of 
Damascus who then distributed responsibility as he saw fit.7 The Pilgrimage also 
benefitted the Ottomans from an economic standpoint. As it was heavily protected, it 
provided a fairly reliable means for the transport of goods. In addition to personal items, 
many pilgrims, who often spent months, even years, away from home, carried spices, 
textiles, precious stones, and coffee to trade with both on their journey and when they 
arrived in Mecca 8 
Throughout the eighteenth century, the Ottomans sought to control Bilad al-Sham, 
particularly Damascus. Though the lack of success of their attempts (after roughly 1750) 
may have been somewhat discouraging, it is noteworthy that they indeed tried to create a 
more centralized state of affairs within the region. Barbir emphasizes three distinct 
spheres in which the Ottomans sought to reassert themselves: the actual governing of the 
province, the containment of local groups, and the reorganization of the Pilgrimage as 
outlined above. Throughout this period, the Ottoman state espoused the idea of patronage 
as it sought to garner the support of local tribes by giving them responsibilities that 
included the protection of the Pilgrimage route.  
To avoid transforming this analysis into an exploration into the intricacies of 
Ottoman rule in Syria, attention will now turn to another interesting episode of Syria’s 
history, and another in which it was ruled by an outside force, only this time it was 
neither Ottoman nor French. Thus between 1831 and 1840 Syria was controlled by the 
                                                
7 See Ibid., 110-113. 
8 See Rafeq, Province, 73-75. According to Rafeq, the arrival of pilgrims to Damascus had a significant 
effect on the city’s commerce, which was stimulated almost as soon as they arrived. 
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forces of Muhammad ‘Ali, led by his son Ibrahim Pasha. As will be seen, a significant 
factor in the “Egyptian” decision to invade Syria was due in large part to its strategic 
position. Seeing Syria as the natural defense of Egypt’s eastern frontier, Muhammad 
‘Ali’s decision seemed straightforward enough. Initially, many notables offered 
concessions to the Egyptians, and resistance was fairly scattered.9 Something of a ‘fatwa 
war’ ensued, with the Ottoman government labeling Muhammad ‘Ali and his son 
“traitors to the state and apostates from the religion of the [Islamic] community.”10 In 
return Muhammad ‘Ali obtained a fatwa from the Sharif of Mecca declaring the Ottoman 
sultan an ‘infidel’ and “unworthy of his office on account of the innovations he 
introduced contrary to the sacred law and of his imitation of the ways of the infidels.”11 
 Perhaps surprisingly, the immediate reception of Egyptian rule was not altogether 
negative. In 1833 Sultan Mahmud II acquiesced in Egyptian control of the region, which 
meant that Ibrahim Pasha was effectively the governor of Syria. According to Albert 
Hourani, the first few years of Egyptian rule “may be regarded as the beginning of the 
modern era for the country [Syria]. For the first time in centuries it was given a 
centralized government strong enough to hold separatist tendencies in check, and a 
system of taxation which was regular and comparatively rational, although burdensome.” 
Furthermore, as will be seen, greater equality was established between Muslims and non-
Muslims, government funded schools were opened, and commerce and cultivation 
improved due to “an improved state of public order.”12 Especially receptive to the 
Egyptians were local landowners, whom Ibrahim Pasha sought to co-opt through various 
                                                
9 See Tibawi, 66-67. 
10 Quited in Ibid., 67. 
11 See Ibid. 
12 Albert Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, 29. 
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forms of patronage. This popularity, however, was short lived, as landowners rejected 
attempts to limit their authority, and peasants, as will be discussed later, fiercely resisted 
forced conscription.13 
By 1839, Muhammad ‘Ali’s forces were positioned to march on Istanbul, a 
development that transformed the conflict into an international incident. Tibawi asserts 
that Russia hoped to see the ‘Sick Man of Europe’ disintegrate so it could seize what it 
wished, while Great Britain wished to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, 
partly to ensure that none of its rivals got hold of any part of it, and partly to preserve its 
communications with India.14 Despite the fact that some Maronites may have felt that 
they had been liberated, the experience of Egyptian rule was mostly negative. 
Muhammad ‘Ali sought to exploit whatever resources were available, often resorting to 
forced labor for miniscule wages. On other occasions, Egyptian leaders “seized men in 
the streets to work as forced labour or raided households to collect recruits for the 
army.”15 Schilcher relates the story of an afternoon in which ten Egyptians sought to 
requisition camels and seize a fugitive in the Damascus quarter of Maydan, only to have 
100 Maydanis turn against them. The Egyptians returned with reinforcements, stormed 
the citadel, raided a Sufi compound, and seized and executed a number of men.16 
 One the other hand, according to Moshe Ma’oz, “It was, in fact, under Egyptian 
rule that for the first time reforms were introduced into Syria and Palestine.”17 The ten 
years of occupation “put an end to a long period of confusion and backwardness and 
                                                
13 Ibid. 
14 Tibawi., 68-69. 
15 Linda Schatkowski Schilcher, Families in Politics: Damascene Factions and Estates of the 18th and 19th 
Centuries (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1985), 46. 
16 Ibid., 46-47. 
17 Moshe Ma’oz, Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861: The Impact of the Tanzimat on 
Politics and Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 12. 
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opened a new era in Syrian history. The bold measures carried out by Ibrahim Pasha 
brought about a profound change in almost every aspect of the old life, and in certain 
respects paved the way for the later Ottoman reforms of the Tanzimat.”18 These reforms, 
however, did not come without opposition.  
A significant role was played by the Egyptian military in the administration of the 
‘new’ Syria (a formula that would eventually resurface with the ill-fated UAR of 1958-
1961) that led to discontent among many Damascenes and notables of the region. 
Furthermore, the Egyptian regime could control the local population only with the 
assistance of a sizeable military force, a vital component of any authoritarian 
government. There was a significant restructuring of the political landscape, as Syria and 
Palestine were placed under the supervision of a civil ‘Governor-General’ stationed in 
Damascus. The Egyptian regime initiated a policy of regular conscription, which 
weakened the local governments both politically and militarily.19 Although most Syrians 
were not especially well-disposed towards the Egyptians, Ma’oz insists that  “under the 
rule of Ibrahim Pasha, the Syrian population enjoyed for the first time considerable 
security of life and property, greater justice and opportunity for legal redress, and a more 
equable system of taxation.”20 In addition the Egyptian occupation led to the flourishing 
of trade and agriculture, thanks in large part to the introduction of new farming methods 
and new crops.21  
 The Syrians, however, were less impressed with forced conscription, higher 
personal taxation, the use of mosques as military barracks, and the establishment of 
                                                
18 Ma’oz, Ottoman Reform, 12. 
19 Ibid., 14-15. 
20 Ibid., 15. 
21 Ibid., 15-16. 
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European consulates in Damascus and other cities, and by 1840 it seemed to many that 
the Egyptian occupation amounted to little more than exploitation. The Syrian market 
was opened to European textiles, which led to rising competition, and the presence of 
some 100,000 Egyptian soldiers drove food prices skyward. Furthermore, the Egyptians’ 
disregard for local custom and religious culture gradually fomented discontent among 
those who had originally supported them. Ultimately, it was foreign intervention and 
assistance that forced Muhammad ‘Ali to withdraw from Syria. For much of the 
occupation, Britain and Austria had conducted subversive operations in Lebanon, and 
ultimately ended up bombarding Beirut and landing troops on its shores.22 Thus, in May 
1841 Muhammad Najib Pasha arrived in Damascus to assume power, and a new era of 
Syrian history, the imposition of the Tanzimat in Bilad al-Sham, began. 
 
Bilad al-Sham and the Tanzimat 
The beginning of the Tanzimat is conventionally traced to the Gülhane decree, 
issued in November 1839 by Abdülmecid shortly after he succeeded Mahmud II in 
Istanbul. As Ma’oz has explained, the decree had three main areas of concern: 
administration and government, the welfare of the subjects, and the status of non-
Muslims within the Empire.23 According to Ussama Makdisi, the decree was issued “at a 
time when the Ottoman Empire lay on the brink of total collapse due to Muhammad 
‘Ali’s imperial ambitions.”24 It had very specific purposes, namely to ensure the security 
of the lives of Ottoman subjects, the development of a regulated tax system (and the 
                                                
22 Schilcher., 48. 
23 Ma’oz, 21. 
24 Ussama Makdisi, ‘Rethinking Ottoman Imperialism: modernity, Violence and the Cultural Logic of 
Ottoman Reform,’ in Jens Hanssen, The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman 
Empire (Würzburg : Ergon in Kommission, 2002), 31. 
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discontinuation of tax farming), and a system for the “levying of troops and establishing 
their terms of service.”25 Perhaps the most important aspect of the decree was the explicit 
instructions that Muslims and non-Muslims alike were equal before the law: “The 
Muslim and other peoples who are among the subjects of our imperial sultanate, shall be 
the object of our imperial favours without exception.”26 This aspect of the reforms, as 
Makdisi has shown “formally committed the empire to a course of modernization under 
effective western tutelage.”27 
 The intricacies of the Tanzimat are far too complicated for full elaboration here, 
although the consequences of their imposition in Bilad al-Sham are of prime importance. 
For many, the Tanzimat reforms effectively ushered in an era of Ottoman ‘imperialism.’ 
In Empire in the City, Jens Hanssen writes that late Ottoman imperialism emerged “as a 
dialectic and discursive process between imperial perceptions of the Empire’s own past 
and its provinces as backward on the one hand and of contemporary European states as 
models of progress and modernity to be aspired to on the other.”28  
What, then, serves to differentiate the system and structure of Ottoman 
imperialism from its French counterpart? Unlike the structure that emerged under the 
French Mandate, the Ottoman imperial structure consisted of an array of  “colonial 
situations rather than constituting a closed, coherent and clearly structured system of 
power.”29 In other words, the Ottoman ‘state’ was never the sole beneficiary of the 
exploitation of the indigenous population of Bilad al-Sham. Ottoman imperialism, unlike 
its British and French counterparts in the early twentieth century, had no real ‘colonies.’ 
                                                
25 Ma’oz, 22. 
26 Quoted in Ma’oz., 22. 
27 Makdisi, ‘Rethinking Ottoman Imperialism,’ 31. 
28 Hanssen, Empire in the City, 9. 
29 Ibid., 7. 
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What the Ottoman state actually accomplished via the Tanzimat in Bilad al-Sham was 
markedly different from what might be expected. According to Hanssen, the imperial 
state “attempted to assume monopoly over the interpretation of modernity” and it was the 
discourse of modernity, not the processes of modernization, “that set the Tanzimat apart 
from preceding modes of Ottoman provincial rule.” Many of the previous forms of rule, 
including control based on tribal affiliation, came to be viewed as “remnants of the past 
that hindered ‘enlightened’ imperial reforms.”30  
 Again there is the question of ‘what does it all mean.’ In the early nineteenth 
century, Syria experienced a decade-long occupation and the imposition of drastic 
reforms, which some have argued were a direct result of the policies introduced by 
Muhammad ‘Ali. One accomplishment of the Egyptian occupation, which was 
capitalized on by the Ottoman government soon after it came to an end, was the way in 
which local and feudal leaders were effectively stripped of their power. Throughout 
Ibrahim Pasha’s time in Bilad al-Sham, a strong centralized style of government was 
developed. This government had the backing of a substantial military force, which in turn 
depended on the government for its day-to-day provisions. It is perhaps far-fetched to 
compare this governmental structure to the rule of Hafiz al-Asad in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, but there are some similar characteristics. Further similarities can be 
seen in the ways the Ottoman state attempted to control the discourse of ‘modernity.’ 
Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, Istanbul attempted to exert its power 
over the Arab provinces through a variety of means.  
The 1858 Land Code was one of the more notable reforms announced by the 
Ottoman government as part of the Tanzimat. In a broad sense, the code can be seen as 
                                                
30 Ibid., 9 
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somewhat of an attempt to centralize administration within the province of Bilad al-
Sham, as “The communal or tribal forms of land tenure that prevailed in most of the 
region were slowly replaced by private ownership, and subsistence farming gave way to 
production for the market.”31 Essentially, absentee landlords, whose families had held the 
rights to their land for generations, replaced these tribal farmers under the new system. 
Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett have argued, echoing Moshe Ma’oz, that one 
lasting legacy of Ibrahim Pasha’s rule in Syria was his success in controlling the 
influence of tax farmers, who had dominated the region since the sixteenth century.32 The 
basic purpose of the code was to reassert the Ottoman government’s complete ownership 
of the tapu (state owned) land, and it was used to raise revenues, “to take advantage of 
the evident demand for the formalisation of ‘property rights’, however defined.”33 As a 
result, the region of Bilad al-Sham became increasingly integrated in the economic 
organization of the Empire, as it produced a significant amount of grain that was sent 
throughout the Ottoman provinces. 
 
From Abdul-Hamid II to the Young Turks 
One of the more notorious moments of Syria under late-Ottoman rule took place 
in 1860 as thousands, mostly Christians, were massacred both in villages on Mount 
                                                
31 Charles Issawi, An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1982), 4; quoted in Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett, ‘The Application of the 
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32 Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, 410-411. 
33 Ibid., 414. 
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Lebanon and in Damascus.34 Moshe Ma’oz puts forward the ‘traditional’ account that 
these massacres, and the subsequent destruction of several European consulates, were 
directly tied to “Muslim-Christian antagonism which developed from the Tanzimat 
reforms, notably the Hatt-i Hümayun  (Imperial Rescript)” that further emphasized the 
equality of Muslims and non-Muslims before the law. The Muslims of Damascus, 
according to Ma’oz, were “more sensitive that other Muslims in the country to the change 
in the traditional orthodox character of the city,”35 and this fact, coupled with the 
increasing tendency among Christian inhabitants of the city to make their faith more 
prominent, culminated in tragedy. There was also a significant current of suspicion 
among Damascene Muslims, as they viewed the recent declarations made by the Ottoman 
government, and the subsequent increase in “defiance and insolence” among Christians, 
as a manifestation of European meddling, specifically a European-Christian attempt to 
undermine the Islamic nature of the Ottoman Empire.36 
The sectarian nature of the riots should not be taken lightly, nor should it be seen 
as the sole cause. Some historians, notably Abdul-Karim Rafeq, have proposed the idea 
that the events of 1860 (and 1850 in Aleppo) were not as sectarian as once thought, and 
thus have, in the words of Eugene Rogan, sought to “distance the exceptional events of 
1860 from explanations grounded in primordial sectarian differences.”37 In an article on 
the 1860 riots, Rafeq pays particular attention to the inheritances of eight individuals, 
                                                
34 Similar events had taken place in Aleppo in 1850, and occurred simultaneously in Lebanon in 1860, as 
Lebanese Druze massacred Lebanese Christians in 1860. See Bruce Masters, ‘The 1850 Events in Aleppo: 
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35 Ma’oz, Ottoman Reform, 231. 
36 Ibid., 232-233. 
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noting that creditors were often given precedence over heirs in the distribution of wealth 
of the deceased. With his characteristic attention to detail and careful use of course 
records, Rafeq paints a new historical picture, one that looks not only at the composition 
of wealth of those who participated in the riots, but also where and how they gained their 
wealth and what that says about the economic bases of power at the time. For Rafeq, the 
1860 events were less about the ‘emancipation’ of Christians that resulted from the 
Tanzimat reforms, but more about economic rivalry between the different communities 
(Muslim, Christian, etc.) within the social elites. Surely, as Rafeq points out, there is the 
obvious possibility that the debtors incited the riots to see the “elimination” of their 
creditors.38 
 A lasting effect of the events of 1860 in Damascus was the almost immediate 
migration of large numbers of Christians from Damascus to ‘safer’ regions of the Empire. 
New schools were constructed, intended for both Muslims and Christians, with the first 
emerging in Aleppo. These attempts, however, had little impact on a population that 
appeared to grow more and more dissatisfied with their situation quite rapidly. The 
reforms announced and implemented by the Porte were seen not only as concessions to 
imperious European desires, but as affronts to Islam as well.39 Europeans noticed this 
apparent dissatisfaction as well, and would soon transform it into part of their moral 
justification for taking control of the Arab provinces:  
During the long and unrestrained dominion of Egypt over Syria, the languages, 
sympathies, interests and prospects of the Turkish Empire were daily becoming 
more and more estranged from the minds of the people and it was no uncommon 
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thing to hear inhabitants express their opinion that the Sublime Porte would never 
again have the Government of the country.40 
 
In his work on Syria, Albert Hourani characterized the rule of Abdul-Hamid II as 
“one of tyranny and one of repression” although Kayali and Selim Deringil have 
somewhat modified our understanding of this period. 41 Hourani also noted that despite 
this state of affairs, some Syrians prospered, since many of the Sultan’s advisors 
happened to be Syrians themselves. However, despite Abdul-Hamid’s attempts to 
cultivate political consciousness into an element that could be used as an ideological 
weapon against the West, namely pan-Islamism, most of the political ideology that 
emerged under his rule was directly related to desires to see an end to autocracy.42 This 
movement was splintered, as some wished to see the revival of constitutional rule that 
came about with the promulgation of the 1876 Ottoman constitution, which also included 
a limitation, although not the elimination, of the power of the Sultan; this line of thought 
was espoused by the Young Turks.43 The second, and perhaps more notable, sought 
changes in the status of the Arab provinces. As Hourani points out, they were rather 
united along the lines of ‘knowing what they did not want.’ At this time, Arab 
nationalism did not really entail complete independence from the Ottoman government, 
but rather a sense of autonomy within the Empire.44 
                                                
40 Quoted in Ibid., 245. 
41 By no means was this period devoid of positive developments. Abdul Hamid II ordered the construction 
of the Hijaz railway, and espoused the projects of building several shorter inland and coastal railways; see 
Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-
1918 (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1997), 156-158. See also Selim 
Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 
1876-1909 (London, I. B. Tauris, 1998); and Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, esp. 30-38. 
42 See Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, 38-39. 
43 Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, 39; for a nuanced account of the Young Turks, see Eric Jan Zürcher, The 
Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk’s Turkey (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2010). 
44 Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, 39. 
 31 
Throughout the Tanzimat period, the Ottoman army served the purpose of 
controlling potential local insurrections, and military organization meant more troops 
were stationed in Syria, which also led to a more efficient tax collection system.45 
However, by 1875 the military presence in the region no longer served as a significant 
deterrent, as several ‘proto-nationalist’ groups emerged, among the two types of 
opposition movements explained by Hourani. Secret societies also gained influence, as 
one, led by Faris Namir, espoused an interfaith platform composed of an emphasis of 
Arab identity based on a common literary and cultural heritage, which in turn led to an 
anti-Turkish government platform.46 Hourani also mentions a few “ineffective societies,” 
the Ligue de la Patrie Arabe established in Paris in 1904, noting the characteristic 
disorganization of the early nationalist movement.  
Soon, however, more organized groups emerged, including the Party of Ottoman 
Decentralization that was founded in Cairo in 1912, which espoused the above-mentioned 
idea of greater autonomy within the Empire. al-Fatat and al-‘Ahd, two secret societies, 
emerged in 1911 and 1914, respectively, and the First Arab Congress met in Paris, in an 
effort to determine more precisely the relations of the Arab provinces with the central 
state. 47 Two principal groups, the Turco-Syrian Committee and the Parti Constitutionnel 
en Turquie, led by Salim Faris, emerged as noticeable promoters of what Kayali terms a 
“Syrianist” current of nationalist thought. These groups emphasized the elimination of 
                                                
45 See Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 
1908-1918 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1997), 32-33. 
46 Ibid., 33. 
47 James Gelvin has shown that the membership al-Fatat came from the “middle strata and second tier of 
Damascus nobility.” He further shows that, perhaps fearful of the “low quality” of some new members, the 
group formed the public Arab Independence Party (hizb al-istiqlal al-‘arabi), which acted as “a public front 
for the organization.” Faysal, however, ultimately banned the party in 1919; James Gelvin, Divided 
Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire (Berkeley, Los Angeles and 
London: University of California Press, 1998), 57-60. 
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religious difference, the improvement of general conditions in the region, and the full 
integration of Syrian society. In essence, these groups “sought the integration of ethnic 
and religious groups within Greater Syria around a regional identity within the 
Ottomanist framework.”48 However, it is important, first, that these activities involved no 
more than a tiny minority of the population, and second, that only minority within that 
minority ever raised the specter of ‘secession’, for the reasons that have already been 
discussed.  
It would be hard to argue that these ‘secret’ societies remained as such, or that 
European interest and interference in the region went unnoticed. Thus, it is no 
coincidence that Ottoman rule during the early twentieth century, specifically the wartime 
governorship of Jamal Pasha, has been described as a ‘reign of terror’ directed at 
regaining total control over the region. Jamal Pasha was appointed to Syria in 1915, and 
provisional law assured that he had final say in the affairs of Syria on behalf of the 
Ottoman Empire. Hasan Kayali argues that Jamal Pasha’s rule in Syria was “draconian,” 
and that coupled with the disasters, both natural and war-related, led to the alienation of 
the population from the government. Interestingly, before his negotiations with the 
British, Sharif Husayn had also corresponded with Istanbul, which clearly illustrates that 
he and the Ottoman government were “actors who sought out their options and best 
interests, and not merely as passive victims of Great Power intrigue.”49 However, the 
actions of Jamal Pasha evidently forced Husayn to pursue his British option. Jamal’s 
‘reign of terror’ began early in 1915 as Ottoman forces broke into the French consulates 
                                                
48 Kayali, 42. 
49 Ibid., 191. 
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in Damascus and Beirut, which led to the discovery of documents hinting at subversive 
activity and the eventual punishment of Arab political and cultural leaders.50 
 Two prominent leaders, both of whom apparently expressed desire for Arab 
autonomy, were hanged in May 1916, a spectacle preceded by the hanging of a Maronite 
priest in ‘Alayh for treason. A second tactic employed by Jamal was deportation, and 
under his command up to 5,000 Syrian families were deported to Anatolia while scores of 
Armenians were simultaneously being deported from eastern Anatolia to the Syrian 
Desert.51 Thus, while there was no historical basis for claims that the Arabs had suffered 
‘for centuries’ at the hands of the oppressive Ottomans, it was certainly apparent by the 
end of World War I (encouraged, obviously, by the sudden collapse of the Ottoman state) 
that Syrians, perhaps inspired by talk of independence and ‘self-determination’, felt it 
would be best if they determined their own fate. Throughout the nineteenth century, they 
had protested against conscription by the Ottomans, and suffered brutal treatment at the 
hands of their Egyptian occupiers and the heavy hand of Jamal Pasha. Any expectations 
of independence, however, were soon quashed as the reign of Jamal Pasha was replaced 
with the heavy-handed policies of the French Mandate after a brief interlude of quasi-
independence under the rule of Faysal ibn Husayn.  
                                                
50 Ibid., 192-193. 
51 Ibid., 193. Kayali offers a brief comparison of the deportations of Syrians and Armenians, noting that the 
deportation of Syrians “took place in relatively more humane circumstances.” Furthermore, he emphasizes 
the psychological impact levied by the deportations, as many Syrians, aware of what was happening to the 










‘LA FRANCE EN SYRIE’: MISSION CIVILISATRICE OR  
 
‘ILLIBERAL’ IMPERIALISM? 1  
 
 
What France thought it was doing in Syria from 1920-1946 and what it was 
perceived as doing rarely seemed to coincide. Writing in 1922, Henri Gouraud provided 
what can only be described as an interesting take on the necessity of the French presence 
in Syria: 
Il me semble que je pourrais comparer la Syrie à une petite fille qu’aurait eue la 
France après la guerre, alors qu’elle avait déjà de nombreux enfants, si bien 
qu’elle ne l’a peut-être pas vue venir avec une joie particulière, mais aujourd’hui, 
voyant que l’enfant est jolie, bien portante, intelligente, pleine d’avenir, elle la 
prend résolument par la main pour la conduire vers ses detainees…Sans doute, 
est-ce dans sentiment de mere de famille qu’à la demande ferme du Président du 
Conseil, et grace à l’appui du minister des Finances, du grand patriote qu’est M. 
Doumer, le Parlement vient de me donner les credits necessaries pour que je 
puisse poursuivre “la mission sacrée de civilization” que proclame l’article 22 du 
pacte de la Société des Nations et dont la France a pris le belle et glorieuse 
charge.2 
 
                                                
1 The phrase ‘Illiberal Imperialism’ is drawn from two articles in the edited volume Liberal Thought in the 
Eastern Mediterranean Late Nineteenth Century until the 1960s (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008), one by 
Michael Provence in which he elaborates on the idea of ‘Liberal’ imperialism and colonialism and the other 
by Peter Sluglett entitled ‘The Mandate System: High Ideals; Illiberal Practices.’ 
2 “It seems to me that I could compare Syria to a little girl that France had after the war, when she already 
had many children, so many that perhaps she didn’t see her (Syria) coming with any particular joy but, 
today, seeing that the child is pretty, healthy, intelligent, full of promise, she (France) takes her firmly by 
the hand to lead her towards her destiny…Undoubtedly, it is with the feelings of a mother that, at the firm 
request of the President of the Council, and thanks to the support of the Minister of Finance, to the great 
patriot Mr. Doumer, Parliament has just given me the necessary funds so that I may pursue “the sacred 
mission of civilization”, proclaimed in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, of which 
France has taken beautiful and glorious charge." General Gouraud, ‘La France en Syrie,’ in Revue de 
France (1 April, 1922): 21. 
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Obviously, Syrians were not likely to compare their state, if one could call it that, 
to a ‘little girl,’ just one among France’s many children. In reality, France had a profound 
interest in other parts of the Middle East (and North Africa) as 3 well as in Syria, and 
pursued very different policies in its various possessions. Settler colonialism had long 
characterized the French occupation of Algeria that began in 1830, which would continue 
for 130 years despite fairly strong local resistance. France occupied Tunisia in 1881 and 
later established a protectorate over Morocco in 1912. While the reasons and 
justifications for each of these colonial undertakings differ to some extent, it goes without 
saying that France had a decided interest in maintaining and facilitating its presence in 
the region. 
In any analysis of the French colonial enterprise from the eighteenth- to twentieth-
centuries, one encounters several varying explanations, ranging from the benevolent 
civilizing mission expressed by General Gouraud, to an insistence that France received 
the Mandate over Syria and Lebanon due to her “long educational tradition,”4 to a more 
specific economic interest as explained by Jules Ferry, prime minister between 1880 and 
1881 and again between 1883 and 1885, who was one of the leading advocates of French 
colonial expansion:   
Colonial policy is the offspring of industrialisation [sic]…in this industrial age of 
man, social peace depends on outlets…we must cause fresh categories of 
consumers to appear in other parts of the world, for, if we fail to do so, modern 
                                                
3 Here the term ‘Middle East’ refers to what might be better described as the Middle East and North Africa, 
but for simplicity ‘Middle East’ will be used. 
4 Jacques Stern, former French Minister of Colonies, wrote that “The principal reason for offering France 
mandatory guardianship of these two countries [Syria and Lebanon] was her long educational tradition 
(dating from 1828) of which she was justly proud.” He notes that before 1914 France had built 1,200 
schools, and also notes the desires expressed by Syria and Lebanon to be set free from the Ottoman Empire, 
a claim that is perhaps far less valid than its educational counterpart; Jacques Stern, The French Colonies: 
Past and Future, trans. Norbert Guterman (Didier: New York, 1944), 221. Many contemporaries also 
argued that for France, controlling Syria, by whatever means was in essence an act of ‘reclaiming the 
patrimony that it had once had at the time of the Crusades.’ 
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society will go bankrupt and the dawn of the twentieth century will witness social 
turmoil of so cataclysmic a kind that its consequences are not to be foreseen.5   
 
Later, he rather succinctly asserted what might be considered the best justification for 
colonialism: “one cannot be a great power if one stays in one’s own backyard.”6 
 
Europe in the Middle East at the Turn of the Twentieth Century 
European interest in the Middle East dates back much farther than the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The fact that France had been a major 
participant in the Crusades was not lost on prominent Arab thinkers of the twentieth 
century, and a noticeable contrast can be seen between the beliefs of French colonialists 
as outlined above and those of various Arab ‘nationalists’, such as Sati al-Husri. Husri 
insists that  
The history of French aspirations in Syria is a long one that dates back to the 
Crusades. The French are accustomed to look upon these wars as an achievement 
of their ‘great ancestors’ and to regard the Latin Kingdoms which emerged here 
and there on Syrian soil during those wars as a part of their ‘glorious history.’ 
Naturally, therefore, they have developed an inclination to complete the work of 
those wars and to restore the ancient kingdoms.7 
 
He further insists that this ‘inclination’ to restore the ancient kingdoms was a, if not the, 
principal motive behind France’s desire to “set themselves up as protectors of the 
Christians in the East in anticipation of exploiting them some day as a pretext for the 
seizure of Syria.”8 It is clear that the French were not widely welcome in the 1920s, as is 
demonstrated first by the findings of the King Crane Commission and then by the Syrian 
Revolt, but Husri was evidently making use of the stigma of the Crusades in an attempt to 
                                                
5 Quoted in Henry Brunschwig, French Colonialism 1871-1914: Myths and Realities (New York: Frederick 
A. Praeger, 1964), 84-85. Throughout his time, Ferry saw Tunisia (1881), Madagascar (1885) and most of 
Indochina (1885) added to the French Empire.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Sati al-Husri, The Day of Maysalun: A Page from the Modern History of the Arabs, trans. Sidney Glazer 
(Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1966), 17. 
8 Ibid. 
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mobilize nationalist thought among Syrians. Interestingly, Gouraud also made reference 
to France’s crusader tradition:  
Les traditions françaises sont tres vieilles au Liban et en Syrie. Sans remonter 
jusqu’aux Croisades, qui ont laissé sur le sol les magnifiques châteaux dont il est 
si émouvant de contempler la splendeur et la force, nos missionaires, nos marins, 
nos ingénieurs ont, depuis longtemps, apporté leur dévoûment et leur intelligence 
sur ces côtes.9  
 
He further elaborated that a significant achievement of Lebanon was the prevalence of 
the French language.10 
 A significant factor contributing to European, especially French, interest in Syria 
was the desire to build and control the region’s railroads and shipping lines, and France 
had been instrumental in the construction of the port of Beirut and the railroad 
southwards from Anatolia to Hama and Damascus. While French penetration into Syria 
prior to the twentieth century had largely undertaken by missionaries,11 France had made 
significant investments in the economic structure of Syria by the beginning of the 1900s. 
William Shorrock counters the claim that French control of Syria was merely a product of 
post-war negotiations that were in turn the end result of various agreements such as the 
Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence,12 arguing that 
France had made significant investments in the economic structure of Syria and that the 
French claim to Syria and Lebanon “was recognized internationally even before the war 
erupted. … [T]he nineteenth century had witnessed the tremendous penetration of French 
                                                
9 “French traditions are very old in Lebanon and Syria. Without going back to the Crusades, which left 
magnificent castles in place whose splendor and power are still moving to contemplate, our missionaries, 
our sailors, and our engineers have long applied their devotion and intelligence on these shores.” Gouraud, 
France en Syrie, 6. 
10 See Ibid. 
11 For an excellent account of the history of Protestant missionaries in the Middle East, and the remarkable 
story of one of their Arab converts, see Usama Makdisi, Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and 
the Failed Conversion of the Middle East (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008). 
12 See below. 
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religious influence into Syria and Lebanon through the establishment of clerical schools, 
hospitals, asylums and orphanages.”13 Then there was the ever-present claim that France 
was there to help ‘liberate’ the Syrians and Lebanese from the oppressive Ottomans, even 
if it was limited to providing them giving them autonomy within the Empire. By the late 
1930s, however, this notion had been almost completely disproved. In a recent article, 
Michael Provence quotes a (somewhat a-historical) Friday sermon from Nablus intended 
to rouse the Syrian population given on 7 February 1936:  
Syria, Transjordan, and Palestine were governed justly as one country under the 
Ottoman State. The State of Syria was divided into three parts after the 
occupation. The mandate in all these countries [intends to weaken] the spirit of 
nationalism, kill the common Arab feeling, and plunder their wealth….We ask, 
“Did any year pass after the occupation without bloody revolutions where our 
blood was shed and our rights were swallowed?14  
 
Similar sentiments are also prevalent among modern historians of the region. Jens 
Hanssen, speaking of the claim that Turkish disdain for the Arabs was a major factor in 
the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, asserts that there is no “historical culture and 
political difference along (protonational) Turkish-Arab racial lines.15 As became apparent 
from the findings of the King-Crane Commission, some segments of the Syrian 
population did prefer the French over the Ottomans, but these minority groups, most 
notably the Maronites and other Uniate Christians, likely professed these sentiments in 
efforts to gain certain concessions after the war, rather than out of a genuine distaste for 
the Ottoman Empire. France also had a vested interest in the well-being of the Maronite 
                                                
13 William I. Shorrock, ‘The Origin of the French Mandate in Lebanon: The Railroad Question. 1901-
1914,’ in International Journal of Middle East Studies (hereafter IJMES) 1, no. 2 (Apr. 1970): 133. 
14 Quoted in Michael Provence, ‘Ottoman Modernity, Colonialism, and Insurgency in the Interwar Arab 
East,’ in IJMES 43 (2011): 205. 
15 Hanssen, Empire in the City, 8. 
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population of the region, and was especially friendly to the coastal regions due to their 
place within the French economy. 
 William Shorrock also argues persuasively that while of all European powers 
France had the most substantial historical ‘claim’ to the Levant, Great Britain, Italy, 
Germany and Italy were all developing new interests in the region at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. As these countries’ interests centered on economic issues, France 
realized that “religious and political influence simply were not enough to establish French 
predominance.”16 Of course, France had substantial economic interests: in 1914, French 
investors controlled 62.9 percent of the Ottoman Public Debt, and a combination of 
British and French capital owned the entire Imperial Ottoman Bank.17  
The French position in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, though 
perhaps seemingly stable, faced numerous problems. French politicians and diplomats 
opposed action that might ruffle Russian feathers, including any major investment and 
cooperation with Germany on the Baghdad railway project. At the time, while anti-
clerical sentiment was a growing phenomenon in France, some French diplomats were 
probably justifiably wary of Italy and its potential interests in replacing it as the 
“protector of Catholic interests in the Middle East.”18 Any reservations France had about 
Germany attempting to extend its sphere of influence disappeared soon after the Franco-
German agreement of 15 February 1914, which ultimately defined Syria as within the 
French sphere of influence. Negotiations and an agreement with Turkey followed in 
April, essentially acknowledging France’s continued economic and religious presence in 
                                                
16 Shorrock, 134. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., 139. 
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the Levant.19 It was this historic and economic investment, perhaps more than any desire 
to reestablish the ancient Latin Kingdoms and relive the Crusades, which pushed France 
to request, if not demand, that it be given ‘control’ over Syria and Lebanon after World 
War I.  
 
The Arab Revolt and Broken Promises 
One of the most recognizable Arab contributions to World War I is the Arab 
Revolt, which has since been immortalized in the film Lawrence of Arabia. With 
significant British assistance, including the support of Col. T.E. Lawrence, Faysal ibn 
Husayn, son of the Sharif of Mecca, distracted the attention of the Ottomans throughout 
1916-1918, took Aqaba in 1917, and eventually made his way to Damascus, where it 
became apparent that he would play some sort of role in the future government. This role, 
however, short lived though it may have been, is a vital component of modern Syrian 
history and of the foundation myth of the Syrian state. Though the British may have 
grossly overestimated his likely popularity among Syrians, Faysal seemed at least 
initially a better alternative to foreign rule.  Previous ‘agreements,’ most notably the 
Husayn-McMahon correspondence between the British and his father the Sharif of 
Mecca, which had vaguely promised his father some sort of independent Arab state,20 had 
instilled in Faysal and some of the more politically conscious Arabs of Syria, Lebanon 
                                                
19 For an analysis of the Franco-German agreement, see John Keiger, ‘Jules Cambon and Franco-German 
Détente, 1907-1914, in The Historical Journal, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Sep., 1983): 641-659. Interestingly, France 
and Germany conducted negotiations over Morocco in 1909, leading to a general distrust among France’s 
other European allies. According to E. W. Edwards “[t]he agreement with Germany was an error on the 
part of France. It smacked of disloyalty to her friends for the sake of material advantage.” E. W. Edwards, 
‘The Franco-German Agreement on Morocco, 1909,’ in The English Historical Review, Vol. 78, No. 308 
(Jul., 1963): 513. One of the Recurring problems for France’s investment in Syrian railways was the 
parallel lines running between Damascus and southern Syria, with France owning and operating a 
Damascus-Muzeirib line, which competed with the Hijaz Railway; see Shorrock, ‘‘The Origin of the 
French Mandate in Syria and Lebanon,’ 141-143. 
20 As well as the far less ambiguous Anglo-French Declaration of November 1918 (see below). 
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and Mesopotamia the idea that after the war, thanks to their efforts against the Ottoman 
Empire, they would ultimately be in charge of their own destiny. However, as Gouraud’s 
words illustrate, France had entirely different ideas. The Arab Kingdom of Syria, which 
is considered to be the first ‘modern’ Arab state, lasted only a few short months after a 
declaration of independence and the crowning of Faysal ibn Husayn as king by the Syrian 
Congress. Shortly thereafter, France asserted its control over Syria, and General Gouraud 
took Damascus after the infamous Battle of Maysalun on 23 July 1920.  
Though it was to be ultimately disregarded, the Sykes-Picot agreement is an 
important development in the history of modern Syria. While French interests in Syria 
had been somewhat protected through various prior international agreements, France still 
found it necessary to seek recognition of its vested interest in the Levant. The language of 
the agreement is telling when one seeks to determine the trajectory of French aims in 
Syria. Further sections of the correspondence detail the ways in which Britain and France 
sought to be the ultimate map-makers in the region in the event that the Ottomans were 
defeated, and, at least in regions of their ‘direct control,’ they would ask the opinions of 
the local populations only as they saw fit.  
However, to satisfy the demands of the international community after 1918, the 
French had at least to pretend to ascertain the wishes of the people, and often the reports 
to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations hint at a legitimate 
interest in the state of affairs in the country.21 With the Mandate came a questionnaire, 
intended to ‘guide’ the Mandatory power through its ‘service,’ with questions such as 
                                                
21 See République Française, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, ‘Rapport sur la Situation de la Syrie et du 
Liban [Report on the Situation in Syria and the Lebanon (Paris, various dates). 
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“What measures have been taken to encourage local autonomy?”22 In a very similar 
manner, the Syrian military regimes of the late 1940s-1970 would pay equally little 
attention to the desires and demands of the local populations, instead focusing on how to 
perpetuate their influence and control. One significant difference, however, is that the 
governments in Syria after 1946 were actually Syrian. 
 Judging by the numerous agreements and secret correspondence, the Allied 
powers knew, or at least very much hoped, that the Ottoman Empire was going to be torn 
apart at the end of the war. Thus, the victorious Allies set about determining and defining 
an international policy of dealing with, or divvying up, the former lands of the Ottoman 
Empire south and south east of Anatolia in 1918, and by the time of the treaty of 
Lausanne in 1923 they had completed their objective. The postwar settlements contained 
numerous provisions, and dealt with a number of issues, but the prime concern of this 
thesis is the development and maintenance of the French Mandate over Syria, and its 
historical consequences. Early in November 1918, Britain and France issued the 
following joint statement of their aims in the postwar Middle East:  
The aim of France and Great Britain in carrying on in the Near East the war let 
loose by Germany’s ambitions is the complete and final liberation of the peoples 
so long oppressed by the Turks [my italics] and the establishment of Governments 
and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and the free choice 
of the native populations [in Syria and Mesopotamia]….Far from seeking to 
enforce upon the populations of these countries any particular institution, France 
and Great Britain have no other concern than to insure by their support and their 
active assistance the normal working of the Governments and institutions which 
the populations shall have freely adopted, so as to secure just impartiality for all, 
and also to facilitate economic development of the country in arousing and 
encouraging local initiatives by the diffusion of instruction, and to put an end to 
discords which have too long been taken advantage of by Turkish rule. Such is the 
role that the two allied Governments claim for themselves in the liberated 
territories.23 
                                                
22 ‘Questionnaire,’ Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon. 
23 See ‘France and Britain Tell Aims in East,’ The New York Times (Nov. 8, 1918), added emphasis. 
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This statement, which appeared in the New York Times in November 1918, is one 
of the more notorious pronouncements detailing the Allies’ ‘benevolent’ plans for the 
Middle East after the war. The Sykes-Picot Agreement painted a far different picture; it 
was an attempt to control as much of the former Ottoman Empire as possible without 
appearing to do so. As was common, the Turks were cast as unjust oppressors, while the 
Allies were merely there to guide the fledgling nations along until they could stand on 
their own feet.24 Of particular interest is the sentence beginning “Far from seeking,” in 
that it seems to promise, in every sense of the word, that the ultimate determination and 
decision-making regarding the future of Syria and Mesopotamia would be left to those 
who lived there, not a new international organization based in Geneva, or a parliament in 
Paris.  
 While the principal views and desires of France and the rest of the Allies have 
been outlined above, it now seems pertinent to examine what political arrangements the 
inhabitants of the regions soon to be under Mandate control actually wanted. In the 
summer of 1919, after failing to get for support for an international commission for the 
same purpose, the United States government commissioned two men, Henry Churchill 
King and Charles R. Crane, to conduct a survey of the inhabitants of the region to 
determine if they were indeed ‘ready’ for self-determination and to ascertain their 
thoughts on mandatory rule. The commission was undoubtedly an American endeavor, 
and though it was carried out in accordance with the principles of the League of Nations, 
there was a concerted effort to cast it as entirely ambivalent with regard to colonial 
aspirations:  
                                                
24 It is interesting to note that by 1918, in most correspondence, the territories of Syria and Mesopotamia 
were already being referred to as ‘nations,’ ‘countries,’ and ‘states.’ 
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The American people—having no political ambitions in Europe or the Near East; 
preferring, if that were possible, to keep clear of all European, Asian, or African 
entanglements but nevertheless sincerely desiring that the most permanent peace 
and the largest results for humanity shall come out of this war—recognize that 
they cannot altogether avoid responsibility for just settlements among the nations 
following the war, and under the League of Nations. In that spirit they approach 
the problems of the Near East.25 
 
The findings of the commission were disregarded by the Western powers, but the 
desires of the inhabitants of the region speak volumes to the assertion that France sought 
to ensure its presence in Syria by whatever means necessary. According to King-Crane, 
over 80 percent of those petitioned desired a united Syria; fifty-seven percent opposed an 
independent Greater Lebanon; and ten percent supported the idea of Lebanese 
independence. Just over 59 percent of those asked favored an independent Arab 
Kingdom, and roughly the same number supported Faysal as king, obviously as the 
preferred alternative to foreign control. Perhaps surprisingly, a French Mandate was 
favored over British control (fourteen to four percent) but less than 1 percent favored a 
French Mandate if mandatory rule was ‘obligatory.’ While there was more support for 
British ‘assistance’ than French, the percentage of those who answered in favor of this 
still came to less than a single percentage point. It may seem somewhat controversial, but 
nonetheless American ‘assistance’ was favored by a majority of those petitioned, as some 
57 percent of those asked responded with some degree of approval.26 Despite several 
controversial aspects of the report, including the apparent usage of propaganda and 
misquoting in questions and answers, the commission asserted that 
The petitions are certainly representative. As the classified list of delegations 
received by the Commission clearly indicates, the petitions came from a wide 
                                                
25 See ‘The King-Crane Commission Report, August 28, 1919,’ available online via Brigham Young 
University’s World War I Document Archive, http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_King-Crane_Report, 
accessed 15 March, 2011. 
26 See Ibid. 
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range of political, economic, social, and religious classes and organizations. It 
was generally known throughout Syria that the American Commission would 
receive in confidence any documents that any individual or group should care to 
present. In the few cities in which the military authorities sought to exert control, 
directly or indirectly, over the delegations, without exception the opposition 
parties found opportunities to present their ideas to the Commission, if not always 
orally, at least in writing.27 
 
As mentioned, the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the King-Crane Commission 
report were ultimately disregarded, as the postwar political balance of power was 
drastically different from what it been during the conflict. In the first place, Britain rather 
than France had the most substantial international presence in Syria in October 1918, due 
in part to the fact that the war was in fact fought on French soil. Furthermore, the 
aspirations of many Syrians for independence, especially of those who had cooperated 
with the British and Faysal in the Arab Revolt, were seen as part of a British plot 
intended to undermine French interests. Nonetheless, in November/ December 1918, 
Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau agreed to a new postwar alignment under which 
France ceded its ‘Sykes-Picot rights’ over Mosul to Britain. Further negotiations ensued, 
and Lloyd George attempted to convince Clemenceau and the French to welcome the 
United States and Faysal to the negotiating table, but this was refused. By 1919 Lloyd 
George agreed to cede control of Cilicia and Syria to France. After the departure of 
British troops from Syria, Faysal faced an entirely new problem: he now had to deal 
directly and exclusively with the French, who proved much less in tune with the various 
nationalist sentiments and movements that had been developing in Syria during and after 
the First World War.28 After unsuccessfully appealing to London and Paris for assistance, 
Faysal was resigned to his fate, and by 1920 the future of France in Syria was 
                                                
27 Ibid. 
28 See Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate, 34-39. 
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determined. The French authorities “recognized Syria’s right to self-government and 
guaranteed its independence and territorial integrity” as long as Faysal agreed to accept 
aid only from France.29 In Faysal’s own words, “he had been handed over tied by feet and 
hands to the French.”30 All that remained was for the various agreements and 
arrangements to be endorsed by the international community, through the newly formed 
League of Nations. 
 
The Mandate System 
 
The French Mandate for Syria and Lebanon was formally published on 24 July 
1922 by the League of Nations, and would fashion the political landscape of Syria for the 
next twenty-six years. Though it is often quoted, the language of the Mandate, like that of 
the various correspondences of the era, hints at a period of domination and traces of 
orientalist thought can be ascertained through a careful reading. Article 22 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations laid out the principle of the Mandate System:  
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have 
ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them 
and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the 
strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle 
that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of 
civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be 
embodied in this Covenant….The best method of giving practical effect to this 
principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced 
nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical 
position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, 
and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the 
League.31 
 
There is one specific sentence found in a subsequent section of Article 22 that seems 
especially relevant to this analysis:  
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Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a 
stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be 
provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and 
assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The 
wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of 
the Mandatory.32 
 
So, what happened to the findings of the King-Crane Commission? Granted it was by no 
means a definitive survey of public opinion throughout the region, there still seems to 
have been enough information to prompt the Allies to realize that a mandate for Syria, let 
alone a French Mandate, was the least desired form of postwar government. 
 Nonetheless, the Mandate for Syria and Lebanon was given to the French, and it 
contained several provisions to ensure French control over the region. Article I specified 
that France was to “frame, within a period of three years from the coming into force of 
this mandate, an organic law for Syria and the Lebanon.”33 Again, cooperation with the 
local populations was stipulated, but there was little in terms of enforcement mechanisms 
to make sure that this took place: “This organic law shall be framed with the native 
authorities and shall take into account the rights, interests, and wishes of all the 
population inhabiting the said territory.” Furthermore, “The Mandatory shall, as far as 
circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.”34 The vague language of the Mandate, 
which appears unexceptionable alongside the various declarations and agreements of the 
postwar period, left virtually all decisions to the French Mandatory authorities. The 
mandate goes on to ensure that France would remain in charge of Syria’s foreign 
relations and its judicial system. An interesting continuation of Ottoman policy is found 
in Article 8 of the Mandate. Though it would be erroneous to say that freedom of religion 
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was a recent innovation, the provision against religious and racial discrimination is still of 
interest: 
The Mandatory shall ensure to all complete freedom of conscience and the free 
exercise of all forms of worship which are consonant with public order and 
morality. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of 
Syria and the Lebanon on the ground of differences in race, religion, or 
language.35 
 
The final stamp of French influence came with the imposition of French, along with 
Arabic, as one of the official languages of the Mandate. 
 
Resistance to Domination: The Great Syrian Revolt of 1925-1927 
 
In 1922, General Gouraud had the following to say about the state of affairs in 
Syria and Lebanon:  
la Syrie et le Liban ont été tres calmes pendant l'année écoulée , et ils seraient 
meme restes completement, n'étaient les excitations venues du dehors.  Celles-ci 
se sont surtout manifestées dans le Nord, où une propagande très active a été 
menée et où toute une organisation destinée à troubler le pays a été constatée.36  
 
The problems of the north were the armed tribal bands, which were wreaking havoc on 
the borderlands with Turkey, slowly increasing in both number and frequency.37 
According to James Gelvin, “the most effective of the committee-affiliated guerilla 
leaders was Ibrahim Hananu.”38 Hananu was a former member of the Syrian Congress, 
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but he had resigned that post to contribute to the resistance against the French, and helped 
organize logistical support, coordinated guerilla units, convinced local ‘ulama to declare 
jihad against the French, and “insured the rebellion would remain self-sustaining.”39 
Furthermore, throughout the war and its immediate aftermath, French authorities grew 
increasingly suspicious of the aims of other Allied powers, especially Britain and its 
heavy wartime investment in Syria and close ties to Amir Faysal.  
The final episode in the history of mandatory Syria that will be dealt with in this 
thesis is the revolt against French rule initiated by local leaders in Jabal Hawran.40 The 
revolt was significant, but it did not throw off the French, or hasten the process of French 
withdrawal. Rather, it ensured that the remaining years of the Mandate would be even 
more authoritarian in nature than had been imagined, as well as ushering in an era of 
what Philip Khoury has termed ‘honorable cooperation.’41 
 Although full-scale rebellion did not erupt until 1925, organized and physical 
resistance to the French presence emerged soon after France took control of the region. 
When the short-lived government of Faysal was overthrown by the French, thousands of 
Syrians marched to the pass of Khan Maysalun in an attempt to keep French forces from 
occupying Damascus. Many of these Syrians had vehemently opposed attempts by 
Faysal’s government to conscript them into the army, based largely on their memories of 
World War I, a fact that supports the idea that though the revolt did emerge with some 
nationalist sentiment, it was more about the desire to be free of foreign control. Even 
though the numerically and technologically superior French forces easily defeated the 
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rag-tag group of army veterans, merchants, religious leaders, and quarter bosses, the 
ready mobilization of these Syrians should have served as an indication of what was to 
come. 42  
The French defeated the Syrians, but what soon became apparent was that the 
popular mobilization exemplified by this resistance to the French taking of Damascus 
was emerging as a more organized and more concrete movement. While labeling such 
movements as strictly ‘nationalist’ poses problems, as James Gelvin has argued,43 by this 
time they were far more organized, and had far more precise objectives,  than their pre-
war predecessors. They developed the ability to recruit members who shared the same 
ideological foundation, whereas groups like al-Fatat often lamented the disorganization 
and low quality of their new recruits.44 These ‘new’ organizations of the 1920s, despite 
their divergent views on what the future makeup of Syria should be, all agreed that the 
most desirable future was one without the French. Further complicating the matter was 
the fact that this ‘nationalist’ thought was no longer solely the concern of national elites. 
Before the mid 1920s it was educated Syrians who were able to travel abroad and form 
their secret and public societies who promulgated the ideologies one would consider 
‘nationalist;’ by the beginning of the Great Syrian Revolt, it was rebels from the 
countryside, “ordinary Syrians,” who were sacrificing the most in the effort to rid Syria 
of French rule.45 
                                                
42 Provence, 49. 
43 Divided Loyalties. 
44 Ibid., 57-60. 
45 See Michael Provence, ‘Identifying Rebels: Insurgents in the Countryside of Damascus, 1925-1926,’ in 
Thomas Philipp and Christoph Schumann, eds., From the Syrian Land to the States of Syria and Lebanon 
(Beirut: Orient Institute, 2004), 291-306. 
 51 
 The fighting started when Druze men opened fire on a French airplane near Jabal 
Druze, on 18 July 1925. Some two days leader, the Druze leader Sultan al-‘Atrash and a 
group of armed men on horseback seized the town of Salkhad, and the following day a 
band led by Sultan Pasha ambushed a column of 166 Algerian and Syrian troops who had 
been sent to rescue the stranded pilots. In perhaps the most significant early action, later 
that same night al-‘Atrash’s forces seized Suwayda’, which played a prominent role as 
capital of Jabal Druze and a “central point of French administration.”46 The popularity of 
al-‘Atrash’s movement increased almost immediately, and its numbers swelled into a 
small army, equal to roughly one-fifth of the regional population.47 At the end of the 
month, another Druze contingent, again led by Sultan al-‘Atrash, ambushed a relief 
column of 3,000 French troops, which led to the suicide of a French commander whose 
troops had fled and the capturing of over 2,000 rifles by the Druze rebels.48 
 As has been said, the origins of this conflict can be traced almost directly to 
French colonial policy. In an attempt to secure the loyalty of the region, French 
authorities sought to gain the support of certain Druze leaders, often at the expense of 
relationships with others. Salim al-‘Atrash was elevated to an official position in the 
Druze area, which led to nothing more than hostility from his ‘equals.’ The French 
authorities made sure that they were able to retain control over the Druze governors, and 
the agreements between the two parties stipulated that French administration could 
remove any governor it deemed unacceptable for any reason.49 The effect of this policy 
cannot be understated. In a region where tradition was paramount, it was rather difficult 
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for the various Druze leaders to accept this change, seeing that their traditional routes to 
power and prestige were literally cut off by new French policy. In the words of Philip 
Khoury, “the cause of Druze, as of Syrian discontent lay in France’s persistence in 
applying methods learned in North Africa to the very different Syrian situation.”50 
 By August 1925, the revolt had started to spread, and revolutionary decrees and 
tracts appeared throughout the inner cities of Syria, particularly Damascus. On 3 August 
1925, a notice appeared in the Damascus bazaar that read 
O Arabs, descendants of glorious ancestors, we appeal to you to awake in these 
critical times of great tragedy under the government of France. There is nothing 
left to us but to mount a vigorous attack and expel this government from our 
country….O people, this is an auspicious moment, we must not let it pass….The 
time has come to realize what you have promised to yourselves….Unleash your 
arms before the enemy who has invaded our homes, set fire to out temples of 
God, and tread on our sacred books.51  
 
By the time the revolt reached Damascus, as this notice shows, it had acquired mild 
Islamic undertones, though it was largely an expression of distaste for colonial rule. 
Similar tracts appeared in other cities, such as Homs and Hama, and these posters also 
called for armed resistance to the French.52 A poster found by the French authorities in 
Homs addressed to “all Patriots” stated: 
The time has come to rise from our slumber and cease our silence. The hour of 
vengeance, of sacrifice, and of liberty has arrived. We shall cast off the chains of 
silence and gain our liberty by spilling our blood to save our homeland from the 
clutches of the tyrants and give voice to independence and liberty….Long live  
Syria, independence, and liberty.53 
 
Almost immediately after the discovery of this poster, the rather extensive network of 
French intelligence sprang into action and numerous young men suspected of knowing 
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more than they should about the posters were brought in for questioning, detained over 
night, and likely subjected to torture.54 This quick resort to torture and intense 
questioning and interrogation is part of what Michael Provence has termed “the 
subversion of the supposed legal structures of the Mandate.”55 According to Mandate 
law, and as laid out in the Mandate itself, when crimes were suspected, responsibility for 
an investigation lay solely with the local government. By this time, however, martial law 
was in place, which virtually did away with any semblance of local authority, and gave 
ultimate discretion to the French high commissioner.  
 Even though the revolt began in earnest in the fall of 1925, the French 
counteroffensive did not take place until well into 1926. By that time, the Syrian leaders 
had made their demands known through a series of appeals to Mandate authorities. First, 
they called for a general amnesty; second, they demanded the unification of Syria, which 
would include the state of the ‘Alawites, the (“return” of the) provinces added to Lebanon 
to form ‘Grand Liban,’ including the city of Beirut, and the establishment of Damascus as 
a capital; third, they demanded that ultimate authority be given to the local governments 
and the relegation of French authorities to a purely advisory role; fourth, they wanted to 
elect a Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution for this new Syrian state; and 
finally, they asked for a definitive end date for the Mandate.56 These demands were 
nothing new, and if read from a somewhat neutral perspective they appear well in line 
with the original provisions of the Mandate. It should have been obvious that Syrians 
were indeed ready for self-government, if for no other reason than their obvious distaste 
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for their French overlords. These demands, however, were dismissed as unacceptable, 
and the French simply waited until they had enough reinforcements to quash the revolt 
with military strength. 
 
Conclusion 
What does this episode say about the nature of French colonialism in Syria? 
Though French occupation may have originally been presented as a benevolent civilizing 
mission, it was evident that by the end of 1927 this had ceased to represent any kind of 
reality on the ground.  Some segments of the population did favor the French presence, 
predominantly the Maronites and other Uniate Christians, but the general opinion was 
that the French had no place in Syria. According to Michael Provence, “French Mandate 
legal and constitutional structures were not designed to protect the rights of mandatory 
citizens…so-called liberal imperialism was designed to earn praise from the international 
community, affirm French national prestige, and dull leftist criticism back in France.” 
Furthermore, “[t]he cosmetic façade of liberal and constitutional rule fell away” as the 
martial laws and military rule that France resorted to after the uprising became 
commonplace. 57 In ways that would prove characteristic of Syria in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, suspicion, spying, suppression, arbitrary detention, and secrecy 
characterized French mandatory rule after the defeat of the Great Revolt. After all, it had 
already proven incredibly difficult to douse the flames of independence that were ignited 
by the various promises and proclamations made during and after the war. As Peter 
Sluglett has shown, while the French Mandate may have originated on the basis of ‘high 
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ideals,’ by the 1930s it was characterized by ‘illiberal practices.’58 Perhaps there is no 
better way to summarize this fact than by quoting from Philip Khoury’s monumental 
study: “A small but tenacious group of Frenchmen…capitalized on the ‘defensive 
patriotism’ wrought by World War I to commit France to the military occupation of Syria 
in 1920. But, seizing Syria by force was one thing; governing the country was quite 
another.”59 
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AUTHORITARIANISM AS WE KNOW IT: SYRIA FROM 
INDEPENDENCE TO THE FIRST LION OF DAMASCUS 
 
Military Authoritarianism and the Coups of 1949-1963 
Though it may seem counterintuitive when viewed in light of Hourani’s quote 
regarding the perils of relegating history to specific periods, it is nonetheless useful to 
break down the history of post-Mandate Syria into three distinct timeframes; the period 
lasting from 1949-1963, in which Syria fell victim to nearly a dozen coups d’état; the 
period from 1963-1970, which saw the development of Ba‘thist rule in the country, and 
finally the period of 1970 to the present, which constitutes (at least for now) the rule of 
the al-Asad family, beginning with Hafiz in 1970 and continuing with the succession of 
his son Bashar after his father’s death in 2000. Interestingly, in her contribution to an 
edited volume on the less-familiar aspect of Syrian politics, Salwa Ismail begins by 
stating that ”Since the 1960s, Syrian politics have been dominated by authoritarian forms 
of political rule that have concentrated governmental power in the hands of a few.”1 This 
statement is by no means incorrect, but as we have already seen, the authoritarian 
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tendencies of political administration have been manifest in some form or another in 
Syria for quite some time, from the time of the mandate through the years between  1946 
and 1970, during which various factions within the country sought to concentrate power 
in their own hands by whatever means possible, often at the expense of internal and 
external alliances. As a sobering reminder of the chaotic legacy of French colonial rule in 
the country, Syria experienced five military coups during its first decade of 
independence, and ten before the rise of the Ba’th Party in 1963.2 While each coup is 
indeed noteworthy in its own right, the sheer number of coups between 1949 and 1963 
makes an analysis of this nature rather tedious and cumbersome. Therefore, the following 
chapter highlights a few of the more ‘substantial’ coups, with the direct purpose of 
displaying the authoritarian tendencies of post-Mandate Syrian politics. 
 
The Coups of 1949 
As mentioned, modern Syria was barely three years old when it experienced its 
first military coup, on 30 March 1949, when Colonel Husni al-Za‘im, then chief of staff 
of the Syrian Army, ordered the arrest of President Shukri al-Quwwatli and other 
prominent members of the government. In a pattern common to most coups of this type, 
various detachments of the army loyal to Za‘im surrounded the presidential palace in 
Damascus, the home of the prime minister, the state-run radio station, and other 
important governmental sites. After control of these locations had been secured, the 
‘new’ government of Syria announced, over state radio, the reasons for the overthrow of 
the government, which essentially amounted to allegations of corruption and 
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incompetence against the previous regime. Some have suggested that a significant factor 
among Za‘im’s supporters’ desire for the overthrow of the Quwwatli government was 
widespread resentment over the Arab failure in the war in Palestine in 1948 (a similar 
sentiment would later be seen in the aftermath of the 1967 War), but according to George 
Haddad “It is not certain, however, that Colonel Za‘im and the officers who made the 
coup acted out of patriotic concern about…the weakness displayed by the Quwwatli 
regime in Syria.” In reality, “the authors of the coup, as it seems, were rather motivated 
by self-interest and they exploited the unrest that followed the disastrous war to their own 
advantage.”3 
 According to Haddad, Za‘im’s government was characterized by heavy-handed 
personal rule, and, as many ‘new’ dictators are prone to do, most of his early efforts were 
directed at gaining internal legitimacy, especially since Faris al-Khoury, Speaker of the 
Chamber of Deputies, was convinced that the coup was a direct affront to the 
constitution.  Interestingly, in the best interests of the country, Khoury agreed to help 
Za‘im obtain legitimacy from various factions within Syria.4 Remarkably, this first 
effective change of government in post-Mandate Syria came about with little or no 
bloodshed, and was favored, in part, by the younger generations of nationalists who had 
grown wary of the ‘old guard,’ so to speak. For the time, some of the reforms enacted by 
his regime were quite progressive, including the granting of equal voting rights to women 
and removing Islam’s status as religion of the state, yet Za‘im’s foreign policy, according 
to the Middle East Journal in 1949, was “good-intentioned,” but lacked a discernible 
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“shrewdness and diplomacy.”5 For example, tensions soon rose over his willingness to 
allow Turkish officers to oversee the development of the Syrian Army and over rumors of 
significant French and American involvement; the latter would likely have stipulated 
some sort of agreement with Israel.6 There is a rather pervasive notion that Za‘im was in 
fact on the payroll of the United States Department of State, in contrast to the position 
taken up by Quwwatli, who had previously affirmed his desire to pursue Syria’s interests, 
“even if it meant defying America.”7  Perhaps because the had previously planned his 
own movement against the government before 1949, Za‘im was described as “power 
crazy” by Miles Copeland, who noted that “He desired power for the wrong reasons. He 
liked the prerequisites and ego satisfactions of being the boss.”8  
Unfortunately for Za‘im and his followers, the regime was short-lived. Haddad 
provides an excellent summary of why Za‘im was unlikely ever to have been able to 
retain power for any significant amount of time: “The readiness of a military dictator to 
make changes and reforms is not in itself sufficient to consecrate his leadership or 
legitimize his usurped rule or insure him for continuous general approval,”9 A significant 
problem with the Za‘im coup is that it was viewed by many of his contemporaries as 
reactionary, though Haddad suggests otherwise, as a direct response to criticisms over the 
failure of the military in the war in Palestine, which was manifest in threats to cut 
military spending, limited military demobilization, and a drastic cut in officers’ pay. To 
the military officers like Za‘im this was seen as nothing more than political meddling in 
military affairs. Thus, when he lost the support of the military, Za‘im had little chance of 
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retaining power.  Furthermore, he developed a strong internal security apparatus that he 
often used against his own government, and systematically alienated those on whom he 
depended for his retention of power, namely religious leaders, businessmen, politicians 
and, as stated, army officers.10 Though it may have started with decent intentions, it soon 
became clear to many that Za‘im’s regime was not exactly what it had set out to be. 
 “Husni Za‘im passed from the Syrian scene as unexpectedly as he had appeared 
upon it.”11 These words, from 1949, can be applied to the haphazard and spontaneous 
nature of military coups in post-Mandate Syria. The motivations behind those who ousted 
Za‘im in August 1949, led by Sami al-Hinnawi, may have been encouraged by regional 
actors wishing for a more ‘friendly’ Syria, but according to the actors themselves, Za‘im 
had to go for a number of other reasons. Thus, in much the same way as had happened a 
few months earlier, on 14 August 1949 armored troops occupied military and police 
headquarters in Damascus, the state radio station, arrested Za‘im, his chief of military 
police, Ibrahim al-Husayni and the prime minister, Muhsin al-Barazi. Shortly thereafter, 
Za‘im and Barazi were executed. Almost immediately, the new Hinnawi regime set about 
demonizing its predecessors, a tactic often seen in the consolidation of power in 
authoritarian regimes, and criticized Za‘im as despotic, wicked, and incompetent. In its 
first communiqué, the new regime declared it had saved Syria from tyranny, and 
promised that the military would return to the barracks.12 
 In comparison to the personal and authoritarian ambitions of Za‘im, Hinnawi 
appeared far less interested in ruling as his predecessor had. He called for an interim 
government to draft a new constitution, and for the first time the Ba‘th Party was 
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incorporated into the Syrian government, with Michel Aflaq as Minister of Education. 
Many groups within Syria favored some sort of union with Iraq, and Iraqi delegates 
began making trips to Damascus, in a complete reversal of the policy regarding Iraq that 
had existed under Za‘im. The talks about union with Iraq did not last long, as in 
December of 1949, the third time in less than a year, another military coup replaced the 
Syrian government. 
 The third coup, led by Colonel Adib Shishkali, is widely accepted as being a 
reaction to the talks of union with Iraq, and despite efforts to raise support among leading 
army officers, those in positions of power refused to cooperate and acknowledge the 
agenda of the People’s Party (Hizb al-Sha‘b) and its favoritism towards the land-owning 
aristocrats of northern Syria. In a wearingly familiar pattern, armed battalions seized 
strategic offices in Damascus, arrested Hinnawi and his supporters and took effective 
control of the state. In a move not yet seen in previous coups, Shishkali allowed the 
civilian government headed by Hashim al-Atasi to continue operating, but he refused to 
grant them the authority to conduct affairs on their own, and kept close tabs on their 
activities. While it may not have amounted to the obvious spy mechanism implemented 
by Za‘im, this form of military control over the government remained a constant 
throughout the later years of Syrian political life. 
 
The 1958 Coups and the UAR: Authoritarianism from Abroad 
The precursors to the coup that led to the union with Egypt and the subsequent 
domination by Nasserist politics were two coups directly related to the policies and rule 
of Shishkali. While he was successful in overthrowing Hinnawi, Shishkali went further, 
and on 28 November 1951 ordered the arrests of the members of a parliament he himself 
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had ordered created, and “government authority was weakened, civilian rule was 
discredited, and the parliamentary regime was corrupted.”13 If there were questions as to 
whether or not the military, and principally Shishkali, was in charge before November 
1951, they were answered by December. This new personal rule, however, lasted only 
four years,14 as by 1954 there was enough political opposition to supplant Shishkali and 
the military commanders outside of Damascus, where most of his more vocal opponents 
were located, which essentially forced Shishkali to resign, as he feared civil war.15 There 
is perhaps no better way to describe the authoritarian tendencies of Shishkali’s rule than 
by the words of Syrians themselves; in a broadcast over Aleppo Radio, his opponents 
lamented:  
He launched a ruthless war against the people, he stuffed mouths with iron and 
fire, ruled the people with whips and bullets, and used the most vile and beastly 
measures of oppression against anyone who dared to make any utterance…He 
sewed up the country with a wide, terrifying spy-network. He tore the army 
asunder. A senior officer began to fear his most junior men, least they be spying 
on him. Finally, Shishkali wanted us, the soldiers, to be slaves in satisfying his 
blood lusts….We announce that Shishkali is an aggressor and usurper, that his 
rule is not lawful, and we invite the people to set up their adored, popular, 
republican regime with their own hands and entirely by their own will.16 
 
Though he may have considered that his own rule was in the best interests of Syria, his 
opponents saw him as an authoritarian tyrant fueled by a lust for power. The self-
appointed republic proclaimed by the revolutionary communiqué did indeed come to 
fruition, but, following the established trend, only lasted a short time and was brought to 
an end by another coup in 1958 that led directly to union with Egypt. 
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The United Arab Republic 
In his recent book on the rise and fall of Arab nationalism, Adeed Dawisha asserts 
that the dissolution of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1961 after Syria’s secession 
was a “significant fracture” in the “seemingly impregnable armor” of Arab nationalism.17  
Some three years earlier, the unity between Syria and Egypt had been hailed as presaging 
the birth of an Arab nation, one that would soon incorporate more of the surrounding 
independent Arab states. Gamal Abd al-Nasser was severely shaken by the breakup, 
describing the event as more devastating to the principles of Arab nationalism than the 
tripartite attack against Egypt during the Suez Crisis in 1956.18  As well as being 
distraught over the loss of Syria, Nasser felt that the greatest blow came from the 
confidence that the episode had given to the more vocal and radical opponents of Arab 
nationalism.  Interestingly, he chose to continue to refer to his country as the UAR, 
stressing that he would continue to carry the nationalist torch “vigorously and 
purposefully”: 
The United Arab Republic, firmly convinced that she is an integral part of the 
Arab nation, must propagate her call for unity and the principles it embodies, so 
that it would be at the disposal of every Arab citizen, without hesitating for one 
moment before the outworn argument that this would be considered an 
interference in the affairs of others.19 
 
“The United Arab State is a democratic, independent, sovereign Republic, and its 
people are part of the Arab Nation.”20 So began the Provisional Constitution of the 
United Arab Republic, a document signifying the union between Egypt and Syria, a 
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union believed to be the first step towards the formation of an even larger Arab nation-
state.  While the two states were officially united on February 1, 1958, the roots of the 
unification date back several years.  Syrians, including Nasserist politicians as well as 
Ba‘th party members, were the initial proponents of the unification and desired it for a 
variety of reasons, mostly, as could be expected, fairly opportunistic ones.  As early as 
1956, Syrian political parties had adopted and passed several resolutions calling for 
unification with Egypt and according to Monte Palmer, distinct factors influenced Syrian 
politicians to move towards unification.  First, elites, both military and political, were 
experiencing increased pressure both from the communists and parts of the Syrian 
political right; second, the diffusion of power within Syria, and especially within the 
military, had resulted in an impasse that made action by any one group extremely 
difficult, if not impossible; third, the ‘masses’ were restive and had manifested 
considerable desire for unification with Egypt; fourth, many of Syria’s principal political 
actors were emotionally invested in the Arab nationalist movement; and finally, Syrian 
elites were confident that they would emerge as the dominant force in the new Middle 
East.21  
 While the impetus for unification originated with Syrian elites, the first push for 
increased cooperation between the two states was largely an Egyptian product.  Egypt 
sought cooperation with Syria to counter the Baghdad Pact, which had been passed in 
1955 and provided for cooperation between Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Great 
Britain.  By late 1955, however, the Syrians had become the principal proponents of 
integration, but to their displeasure, Egypt initially proved unwilling, as Nasser was 
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hesitant to agree to anything that could possibly compromise Egyptian sovereignty.22  In 
1956, a new Syrian government was formed by Sabri al-‘Asali, this time without any sort 
of military coup. This new government included members of the Ba’th party, which had 
demanded that the pursuit of an Egyptian-Syrian union should become a top priority.  
Additionally, Arab nationalist factions within the Syrian Army began to demand 
unification, and after an extensive debate the Syrian Chamber of Deputies endorsed the 
initiative of pursuing unification with Egypt.23  The Suez Crisis in 1956 halted the Syrian 
push for unification, but by 1957 there were several renewed attempts by the Syrian 
government to persuade Nasser to agree to it. 
 In late 1957, the Military Command Council was established in Syria to act as a 
“self-appointed guardian” of Syrian independence and neutralism.24  When it decided to 
send a delegation to Egypt to seek unification, it did so largely in response to civilian 
demands.  Another strong push came from the Ba’th Party, which, as a self-proclaimed 
promoter of Arab nationalism, could have no other choice, unless it wished to act 
contrary to its own ideology. For some Syrians, unity with Egypt had become the only 
way to ensure unity within Syria itself, and they needed Nasser’s broad appeal to help 
them regain some sort of political stability.25  On the other hand, most, if not all, of 
Nasser’s closest supporters in the Egyptian government advised him against agreeing to 
unification with Syria as intelligence officers offered up a “gloomy prognosis” of Syrian 
stability, emphasizing the ‘inordinate’ power of Syria’s military officers and their 
eagerness to interfere in politics, and recent events gave them plenty of evidence for this 
                                                
22 James Jankowski, Nasser’s Egypt, Arab Nationalism and the United Arab Republic (London : Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2002), 101. 
23 Ibid., 101-102. 
24 Ibid., 104. 
25 Dawisha, 193. 
 66 
claim.  Furthermore, some Egyptian officials tried to convince Nasser that the two 
countries were politically incompatible, as Syria had long espoused a multiparty system 
while Egypt had banned political parties in favor of the National Union.26  When the fact 
that the two countries shared no geographical border was added to the potent mix of 
discontent and outright opposition to the project on the part of many Syrians, unification 
seemed a daunting, impractical, and almost impossible task as its relatively swift failure 
was indeed to show.27  
 If the Syrians thought they would have an equal hand in the formation of the 
UAR, they were to be sorely mistaken.  From the beginning the union was dominated by 
Egypt, Nasser in particular, as a series of demands were presented to Syrian officials.  
One demand was the removal of the Syrian military from politics, and a more significant 
one, which had certainly been expected, was the stipulation that all political parties in 
Syria were to be disbanded and outlawed, as they had been in Egypt.  Thus, the Ba’th 
Party, long the champions of Arab nationalism in Syria would essentially have to 
withdraw from politics to achieve an ideological goal they had ardently pursued for the 
whole of their political existence.  Interestingly, Syria’s president, Shukri al- Quwwatli, 
who had returned to Syrian politics and succeeded Hashim al-Atassi after being ousted by 
Za‘im in 1949, cautioned Nasser as they met to formalize the agreement, warning him 
that he had “taken a people all of whom consider themselves politicians”, half of whom 
think they are leaders, a quarter of whom think they are prophets, and ten percent of 
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whom consider themselves to be gods.  Nasser replied succinctly: “Why didn’t you tell 
me this before I signed the agreement?”28 
 The constitution of the UAR asserted that nationality was defined by public law, 
and that UAR nationality was given to all Syrian and Egyptian nationals.  Furthermore, 
social solidarity was the basis of the UAR and all citizens were equal before the law.29  
Nasser was elected president of the UAR, and Chapter III of the constitution outlines the 
responsibilities of the executive, emphasizing the idea that “Executive Power is vested in 
the President of the Republic, and he exercises it in the manner prescribed by the 
Constitution.”30  Also of importance was Article 64, which stated that Cairo was to be the 
capital of the UAR.31  Essentially, Nasser was given control over the decision- making 
process and the formation of the administration.  He was able to appoint the vice 
president(s) and state ministers, issue laws when the national assembly happened to be 
out of session, and controlled the armed forces.  Although a national assembly was 
stipulated in the constitution, the president (Nasser) was able to select and appoint 
whomever he wished.32  Essentially, Nasser had almost total control over the newly 
formed republic, which could easily have been considered a type of ‘Greater Egypt.’   
 
The Demise of the UAR 
 The stultifying and eventually unbearable Egyptian dominance of the UAR was not 
lost on the Syrians who had pushed for unification.  One reason for the growing 
discontent among Syrians was that unification with Egypt, while ostensibly a major 
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manifestation of Arab nationalist sentiment, was merely the lesser of two evils, although 
better than the various possibilities outlined above.33  Once the pressures from the 
communists and other political factions in Syria were reduced, the Ba’thists and other 
political actors, now without organized parties, moved to express their dissatisfaction 
with the Egypt-centric nature of the unification.  Furthermore, Syrian elites, especially 
the Ba’thists, were surprised to learn that political parties would actually be disbanded 
and that they were essentially unable to operate, even as clandestine groups. They had 
hoped that it was merely a threat by Nasser intended to further the concept of political 
unity between the states. Another significant factor was that Syrians felt as though they 
were being fobbed off with the less desirable positions, in essence an insult to their 
Syrian identity and status as social elites. Egyptian ministers dominated the more 
prestigious posts within Syria, positions Syrian elites believed were rightfully theirs: at 
one time Egyptians occupied over half of the positions within the Syrian Ministry of 
Industry. Syrians also became disenchanted with the massive centralization process and 
many of them felt as though they were being deliberately bypassed in any decision-
making process. Finally, a large number of Syrian officials and officers (including the 
future president Hafiz al-Asad) were relocated to Cairo, a process they viewed as nothing 
more than political exile as they often complained of being placed in charge of menial 
and tedious tasks that had nothing to do with their expertise.34 
 The complaints of the Syrians were not completely dismissed by their Egyptian 
counterparts. Rather, Egyptian actors often sought to justify these complaints and 
asserted that Egypt had more technicians and engineers than Syria (and relative to 
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population size it may well have had), so that the presence of qualified Egyptians in Syria 
was actually necessary for integration to succeed. The Egyptians also claimed that the 
Syrian Army was in relative disarray due to the presence of numerous internal factions, 
while the close proximity of Damascus to the Israeli border made the presence of 
Egyptian military officers and personnel necessary for national security purposes.  The 
transfer of Syrian officials to Egypt was attributed to the lack of training of Syrian 
military officials, and again related to the need for national security.35 
 Perhaps the most significant explanation of the failure of the UAR relates to the 
failure of Arab nationalism in the late 1950s and early 1960s as well.  Simply put, the 
formation of the UAR, while it was often characterized in this way, never really had the 
chance to fulfill the desires of Arab nationalists.  Its failure speaks to the inability of Arab 
nationalism to mobilize and institutionalize the various elements emphasized by thinkers 
such as Sati al-Husri, especially the commonality of language.  Of course, both Egyptians 
and Syrians spoke Arabic, but language was never really a driving force behind the 
unification; it was simply a component of ideology. Furthermore, Egyptians questioned 
the content of the ties between the two states, suspecting that they lacked sufficient 
philosophical, political, social, and economic commonalities to completely and 
successfully unite.36  Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal explained this idea clearly: “There 
were not, in fact, sufficient, necessary and effective ties between the Syrian and Egyptian 
Arab people to establish immediate unity…except one thing—Jamal Abd al-Nasir…One 
person is not enough to make unity.” Syrians also echoed this sentiment, and as Aflaq 
noted: “The level of consciousness among the majority of the people and popular 
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movements in the two countries lacked maturity and order. Many people entered these 
unity movements for parochial reasons, without willingness to bear the full burden and 
responsibility. This attitude encouraged deviation.”37 
 Regardless of the various opinions of Egyptians and Syrians, the fact remains that 
the UAR failed to evolve into the grand project of Arab unity it was supposed to be.  A 
feud between ‘Abd al-Hamid Sarraj and ‘Abd al-Hakim ‘Amr turned into a battle for 
political supremacy, and early on 28 September 1961 Sarraj’s dissident forces had 
confined ‘Amr and the Syrian military regional command in Damascus.  By noon, the 
city was entirely under the control of the dissidents, and by October 3, the coup had 
spread north to Aleppo.38 Nasser, “the preeminent figure in the Arab political universe,” 
faced an unforeseen obstacle, and is said to have referred to September 28, 1961 as one of 
the most difficult days of his life.39 
 
1963 and the Rise of the Ba’th Party 
 Throughout the last three centuries in Syria, there has perhaps been no more 
influential political movement than the Ba’th Party. But, as has been noted concerning 
other elements of Syrian politics, the modes of exploitation and dominance employed by 
the Ba’th were in place before they came to power in 1963. According to Steven 
Heydemann, “By the end of the union [with Egypt] most of the institutions and practices 
associated with populist authoritarianism in Syria were in place,” as redistributive state 
policies and a bureaucratic apparatus intended to increase the peasants’ and workers’ 
share of national income had been introduced. A great deal of private ownership had also 
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been transferred to the state, and there was a marked increase in the role of the public 
sector in the mobilization of state capital.40 
 Interestingly, after Syria’s sudden withdrawal from the UAR, a move encouraged 
by the more conservative factions within the Syrian officer corps, governmental authority 
was handed over almost immediately to a civilian government made up of several leading 
figures from the deposed ‘old guard’ government of 1958.41 This ‘new’ civilian 
government, however, was short-lived, like so many of its predecessors. One would be 
right to question why the Ba‘th Party would agree to the formation of union with Egypt, 
given that Nasser had banned political parties in Egypt, and included the same stipulation 
for the UAR.42 Despite these supposed restrictions, during the union the Syrian Ba‘th 
Party was able to develop and refine several of the tenets that would characterize its rule 
in the coming years. According to Heydemann, one of the most important ‘long-standing 
attributes’ of the Ba‘th Party that emerged during the UAR was the “rise of the 
cooperative movement among rural labor an the reorganization of agricultural 
production.”43 There were extensive land redistribution projects, the extension of 
organizational and economic rights to peasants and nonelites, and, perhaps most 
characteristic of a watchful, authoritarian regime, the creation of numerous state agencies 
whose sole purpose was to oversee development and production in the countryside.  
 To echo Heydemann, it is often held that the union with Egypt was an interruption 
in the linear progression of authoritarian rule that took hold in Syria after 1946.  Rather, 
one should see the union with Egypt as a different form of this authoritarianism, one that 
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created new social and political structures that were readily available for the Ba‘th Party 
to utilize and exploit. In its attempt to further reorganize and restructure Syrian politics 
the secessionist government adopted and adapted the top-heavy structure of the unionist 
government. In essence, this ‘new’ government attempted to rebuild Syria through 
developing the private sector, “[y]et they pursued this aim not by rejecting the authority 
of Nasserist rule but by appropriating and adapting the state-centric, authoritarian, and 
corporatist practices of the United Arab Republic.”44 
 
The Lion of Damascus: Hafiz al-Asad 
The classic work of Patrick Seale is an excellent source on the life of Hafiz al-
Asad.45 Asad, whose full name was Hafiz ibn 'Ali ibn Sulayman al-Asad, was born 6 
October 1930 to an ‘Alawite family in Qardaha, a small town near Latakia, in northern 
Syria. He attended a school in Latakia when he was nine and by 1942 he was one of the 
few young men of his age in the region to take the necessary exams for the primary 
school certificate.46 Later, at the age of twenty-one, he entered the subsidized military 
academy at Homs, from which he would emerge as a lieutenant in the Syrian Air Force.47 
During the French Mandate, many of Syria’s less affluent families sent their sons away to 
military academies, as they were much cheaper, and after independence fees for these 
academies were often greatly reduced, or as was the case in Homs, completely 
eliminated. Furthermore, under French control, a significant number of minorities were 
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recruited or conscripted into the Troupes Spéciales du Levant,48 yet after the abrupt 
French departure virtually no military structure remained. However, minority 
populations, especially ‘Alawite, made up a significant portion of the remaining forces, 
and when these junior officers asked for volunteers, men much like themselves answered 
the call. 
In his detailed study on Syria’s peasants and ‘lesser notables,’ Hanna Batatu 
poses, and answers, a very pertinent question: “What made possible the political 
dominance of ‘Alawi officers in the second half of the 1960s and in subsequent decades, 
when the numbers of their community assed up to less than one-eighth of Syria’s 
population?”49 Batatu further shows that prior to 1963 Sunnis were more prevalent in the 
officer corps than ‘Alawis, but ‘Alawi strength came principally from the minority’s  
massive presence in the lower ranks of the army. Asad’s rise to power, despite the fact 
that he hailed from a rural village in the north and was a member of the ‘Alawi minority, 
became a living symbol of the dynamic nature of Syrian politics and the encompassing 
nature of the Ba‘th Party. He joined the Ba‘th in 1946, when it was still just a political 
‘movement’ yet to be coalesced into a political party, and immediately became immersed 
in the organizations ideology and practice. The party gained extreme popularity in 
Latakia, where the Asad family moved in 1949, and Asad emerged as a leading younger 
member. 1951 saw him elected as president of the nationwide Union of Syrian Students, 
which, as Seale notes, was “a notable first for himself, his party and his community.”50 
He was especially prone to forging street alliances among both minority and Sunni 
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groups, and often challenged the more reserved role of other party members, as well as 
the traditional role instilled on him by his rural upbringing. He was involved in several 
altercations with Latakia’s chapter of the Muslim Brethren, one of which left him with a 
knife wound that took weeks to heal. Essentially, he felt part of the Ba‘th because the 
Ba‘th espoused the characteristics of the young Asad: he was a minority, secular, and 
aggressive.51 
Asad was part of the delegation sent to Cairo, and after the breakup of the UAR 
he was imprisoned by the Egyptians for forty days before he was released in exchange for 
Egyptians detained in Syria. According to Seale, after returning to Syria, Asad set about 
determining how he and his fellow military officers could seize control of Syria, which 
they believed to be headed toward inevitable chaos. In 1962, Asad was a “full time 
conspirator” as he and the Ba‘th Military Committee planned a military coup of their 
own. They sought ought reliable allies among the more senior officer corps, which, 
thanks in large part to the disastrous three years with Egypt, was hardly in a state of 
cohesion. The young committee offered leadership to Colonel Ziyad al-Hariri, and as he 
was about to be stripped of his post and relegated to a post in Baghdad, he accepted. 
Though they were merely young men, who at the time possessed no political clout in 
Ba‘thist circles, the Military Committee decided that it was its turn to take control of 
Syria. 
 While the government that immediately preceded the Ba‘th takeover, that of 
President Nazim Qudsi and his Prime Minister, Khalid al-Azm, came to power through 
what Haddad has termed a “peculiar, peaceful coup,” the same cannot be said of the coup 
carried out by pro-union Nasserist and Ba‘thist groups in March 1963. The leader of the 
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coup, Colonel Ziyad Hariri, like many of his predecessors was characterized by an 
“adventurous spirit,” “self-conceit,” and a “burning desire to exercise power.”52 In the 
already-established pattern, military units occupied Damascus early in the morning of 8 
March 1963, blocked entrance to the city, took control of the radio station, and took 
control of police headquarters and other key government buildings. By 6:20 AM, the 
coup had been announced to the country on state radio. The role played by pro-union 
elements within Syrian society, as well as the role played by Egypt and Nasser personally 
can be seen in the orders given to Egyptian military units to be on alert should the Syrian 
revolutionaries ask for help, and the rather upfront warning to Jordan, Israel, and Saudi 
Arabia that “any outside aggression on Syria is an aggression against the United Arab 
Republic.”53 
 Pro-Nasserist agitation, and a rising fear of Sunni incursions into the high ranks of 
the Army led to further military intervention and subsequent coups, and in 1966, together 
with Salah Jadid, his future political rival, Hafiz al-Asad and the military faction of the 
Ba’th party were growing even more critical of the civilian wing of the Ba‘th political 
machine. In February Jadid and his officer corps seized control of the government. The 
intraparty rivalry that existed within the Syrian Ba’th is a telling feature of the nature of 
the military influence on Syrian politics; as Maniruzziman notes, “It was the gun that 
controlled the Syrian Ba’th Party and not vice versa.”54 Interestingly, after his successful 
takeover at the expense of the civilian wing of the Ba’th, it was Jadid himself who chose 
to ally with the civilian sector when tensions rose between himself and Asad, essentially 
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creating two factions within Syrian politics. Asad soon began to use his position as 
Minister of Defense to consolidate his power over the military, a vital ingredient of 
authoritarian rule.  He forcefully removed Jadid’s supporters from powerful positions 
within the military, perhaps most notably the Chief of Staff, Ahmad al-Suwaydani.  Asad 
did not stop with the removal of Jadid’s supporters; he subsequently placed his close 
friend, Mustafa Tlas,55 in al-Suwaydani’s old position.  In a further attempt to consolidate 
his power over the military, Asad removed Colonel ‘Izzat Jadid, commander of Syria’s 
70th Armored Brigade (the main strike force) and Jadid’s relative, subsequently 
appointing a new colonel loyal to his regime.56 
By the end of 1968 Asad had consolidated his power over the military, but Jadid 
still controlled the intelligence and security forces through the loyalty of ‘Abd al-Karim 
al-Jundi.  Under Jundi, the state’s “apparatus of repression” had expanded to never-
before-seen levels as arbitrary arrests and rumors, as well as the actual practice, of torture 
had become commonplace throughout Syria. Early in 1969, Asad’s quest to consolidate 
power resulted into a conflict over control of the security and intelligence forces.  His 
younger brother Rif‘at controlled one of the state security forces, and after learning of a 
possible assassination attempt against his older brother, he decided to act and convinced 
his older brother to remove Jundi from his position.  In February 1969, the Asad brothers 
strategically removed the editors of the government and party newspapers, replacing 
them with their own loyal followers.  Simultaneously, Asad’s forces removed Jadid’s 
supporters from their government and party offices throughout the capital. Fearing that 
his own tactics of interrogation and torture would soon be turned on him, Jundi 
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committed suicide, thus ensuring Asad’s consolidation of power over the intelligence and 
security forces.57 
 Asad’s domination of the military as well as the security and intelligence 
apparatuses placed him in a position to carry out his ‘Corrective Movement’ in 1970, as 
did the extensive patronage network he had established, including placing his younger 
brother Rif‘at in charge of many domestic institutions. While Rif‘at was at times critical 
of his older brother’s reluctance to capitalize on the advantage he had gained by 
consolidating power over the military and security forces, he was eventually satisfied 
when, on 13 November, 1970 Asad ordered the systematic arrests of his opponents the 
day after the close of the Ba‘th Party congress. 58  Asad offered Jadid a position in a 
Syrian embassy abroad (which was typically viewed as a position of defeat and 
humiliation) and Jadid refused, threatening Asad if he were ever to return to power.59 
 As soon as Asad began the arrests of his opponents, he began to ensure that he 
would retain the power he had gained in the ‘coup.’  The ‘Corrective Movement’ is 
notable because there was relatively little bloodshed, and Asad’s men were able to trap 
their opponents, in his words, “like rabbits in their beds.”60  During this coup, Asad began 
to plant the seeds of his authoritarian rule by placing his close friends and allies in key 
positions, and most of his close friends and associates played some role in his seizure of 
power.  Rif’at took charge of security in Damascus and Mustafa Tlas and another close 
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friend, Colonel Naji Jamil, ensured that Asad would face no resistance from within the 
military. Muhammad al-Khali, another close friend, performed the task of rounding up 
Jadid’s supporters in the military, government ministries, and from within the Ba‘th party 
offices.  An interesting aspect of this takeover is that at least initially it seemed that the 
general population was hardly aware of what had been happening since November 13, 
perhaps because no tanks had filled the streets, and the markets were open and seemed to 
be functioning normally. Asad was careful to control the media, which eventually caused 
some Syrians and observers in other parts of the world to begin to try to figure out 
exactly what was happening inside Damascus.  Asad was careful to make sure his 
takeover went as smoothly as possible, and he took his time tying up loose ends and 
forming a new Provisional Regional Command before making any public announcement.  
Asad had gained regional ‘legitimacy’ when Libyan leader Mu‘ammar al-Qadhafi arrived 
to meet Syria’s new leader only a few days after the ‘Corrective Movement.’61 
Once Asad had taken power, he faced the difficult task of making sure he was 
able to hold on to it.  The political instability that had allowed the numerous coups during 
the 1940s, 1950s, and the 1960s (as well as Asad’s own takeover in 1970) was a critical 
factor in the decisions he made during the formative years of his rule.  As mentioned, the 
Syrian population had become so disgusted with most of the regimes in power before 
Asad that it appeared as though any alternative was welcome.  It seems likely that Asad 
knew this; perhaps fearful that similar disgust could arise in response to his rule, he 
desired to take whatever steps were necessary to ensure that a similar rebellion would and 
could not occur.  Quoting Raymond Hinnebusch, Malik Mufti states that the formative 
years of the Syrian state under Asad eventually allowed him to rule as a “‘presidential 
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monarch’, ruling Syria virtually at will and without the constant fear of being overthrown 
that had consumed his predecessors.”62   As Mufti also states, Asad’s rise to power was 
achieved by relatively ‘conventional’ means, his utilization of his control over the 
military being the most obvious. It would be erroneous to state that Asad created an 
entirely new system of government; various factions of the Ba‘th Party had ruled Syria 
for some seven years before Asad in ways which had made Asad’s seizure of power  
somewhat easier.  One of the notable ‘achievements’ of the Ba‘th Party in the 1960s was 
its ability to minimize and neutralize any political opposition, namely the communists, 
the Nasserists or pan-Arabists, and the Syrian Social National Party (SSNP).63 
Soon after taking power, Asad embarked on a ‘campaign’ aimed at creating 
internal legitimacy for his rule.  In an attempt to appeal to the considerable residue of 
nationalist and pan-Arab aspirations among the population, he announced that Syria 
would join the various union discussions taking place between Egypt, Libya, and Sudan, 
despite the fact that, as would later become apparent, he never had any serious interest in 
unification.64  During or soon after his takeover, Asad strategically removed his 
opposition, notably Jadid and his supporters, from their positions in the government.  
After taking power, he attempted to co-opt various political opposition groups into his 
government, a tactic often employed by other Middle Eastern leaders.  Over half the seats 
in his first cabinet were offered to non-Ba‘th Party members, and he even went as far as 
to forge an alliance, however artificial, between the Ba‘th and the communists and 
several smaller political parties in a National Progressive Front. Essentially, by including 
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the smaller ‘opposition’ parties within the government and the political foundations of the 
state, Asad hoped to limit their voices and influence outside the government, which might 
have possibly led to popular uprisings and the large-scale political mobilization of 
various parts of society.  As in a comparable situation in Egypt, Asad’s tactics were 
simple; by including the smaller opposition within the government, these groups found it 
difficult to exhibit public disapproval or criticize the Asad regime.  However, not all his 
tactics relating to the opposition involved inclusion.  In the early 1970s, the security 
forces, now under his personal control, systematically removed his more vocal opponents 
from within the Ba‘th Party and the military.  He and his followers saw these two groups 
(disgruntled Ba‘th Party members and military personnel) as potential breeding grounds 
for more solid opposition to the regime, especially after the security forces successfully 
prevented two attempted coups against him in 1972 and 1973.65 
Another way Asad was able to consolidate his power was by utilizing increased 
revenues from oil and from foreign aid,66 which allowed him considerable leeway to 
strengthen his regime in a variety of ways.  Military expenditure increased from $384 
million in 1970 to over $3 billion in 1980, and at the same time the military nearly tripled 
in size.67  The drastic increase in the budget and the size of the military was part of 
Asad’s strategy to consolidate his power.  During the military buildup, he began to 
develop his patronage networks within the upper echelons of the military as his regime 
rewarded military prowess and success more than political aptitude and performance.  
Perhaps fearing a coup against his regime, he also began to remove domestic security 
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responsibilities from the military, giving them instead to loyal Ba‘thists, most of whom 
were ‘Alawis and close friends.68 
Asad’s consolidation of power extended beyond the military as he went about 
increasing the size and influence of the Ba‘th Party—membership rose from some 35,000 
members in 1968 to nearly 540,000 in 1984.  The party opened new offices throughout 
the country, and there were attempts to entice previously less-recruited members of 
society, namely women, youth, and peasants. The regime also attempted to further its 
control of the country through new agrarian and educational policies.  The more 
significant of these two was the attempt to use educational policies to foster loyalty to the 
Asad regime and the state.  Almost all Syrian children of school age were enrolled in 
some form of public education by 1980.69 
 
Foreign Policy and Power Consolidation 
 Some of the most interesting ways in which Asad and his regime went about 
securing and consolidating power occurred in foreign policy endeavors throughout the 
early years of his rule.  As Volker Perthes argues, Asad’s foreign policy and his 
domination of the military enabled him to transform Syria into a “strong security state.”70 
As mentioned, he profoundly increased the size of the military and its budget, and the 
regime had to find a way to legitimize and maintain the new larger military force.  This 
led Asad and his regime to pursue a more active foreign policy, one in which it “sought to 
impose its will on its neighbors, rather than the other way around.”71  As Perthes also 
points out, the main source of internal legitimacy for the Asad regime from the beginning 
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was its regional position.  The Syrian Ba‘th Party had always presented Syria as the most 
ardent defender of Arab, especially Palestinian, rights, and also as the hub and rightful 
‘heartland’ of pan-Arabist sentiment.72  If the Asad regime had failed in this endeavor 
early on, the seeds of internal legitimacy it required for existence may never have been 
planted. 
 Thus, it is worth noting that one of Asad’s earliest foreign policy decisions was to 
join the Egyptian attack on Israel on 6 October 1973.  Obviously, it cannot be argued that 
Syria was victorious against Israel, but according to Mufti the October conflict served the 
Asad regime in ways it may not have imagined.  Syria emerged sufficiently strong to 
block any resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict that did not explicitly take Syrian 
interests into account. Shortly thereafter, Asad used his new regional ‘prestige’, however 
real or unreal it was, to appeal to Jordan, Lebanon, and the PLO to avoid going the way 
of Egypt in signing a separate peace treaty with Israel.73 
 After the October conflict with Israel, Syria’s newly expanded military continued 
to serve another purpose.  As a result of the new position it occupied after the conflict, 
Syria achieved the status of being considered a “credible” regional opponent to Israel, 
which in turn led to its receiving substantial “strategic rent” from Russia and the 
wealthier Arab states.  As Perthes points out, it is hard to imagine that Syria would have 
received such aid had Asad not expanded the military and taken his ‘rejectionist’ stance.74  
In this way the persistence of the Arab-Israeli conflict greatly benefitted Asad in his quest 
to consolidate power.  As long as Syria could maintain its status as a ‘credible’ enemy to 
Israel, there was no immediate need to look elsewhere to justify the existence and 
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maintenance of such a large military force.  This strategic “no-peace-no-war” relationship 
allowed the Asad regime to continue the buildup of the military, while simultaneously 
securing the ‘strategic rents’ Syria received from its allies.75 
 
What Opposition? 
Recent events in Syria remind observers of the last time there was a significant 
opposition movement against the Syrian regime, specifically the uprising led by the 
Syrian faction of the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama in 1982. Early in the morning of 
February 3, a Syrian army unit was ambushed by a guerilla force led by ‘Umar Jawwad 
(also known as Abu Bakr).  After additional forces arrived, Jawwad ordered a massive 
uprising and called for jihad against Ba‘th party members in Hama. Over seventy leading 
Ba‘thists had been murdered during the conflict, and the regime faced a legitimacy crisis 
unlike any it had faced before. According to Seale, a general feeling of panic arose in 
Damascus after the Hama uprising, and “the regime itself shook.”76  Before the uprising 
in 1982, the regime had constantly battled the Islamist opposition in Hama, which had 
systematically confronted the Asad regime with accusations of illegitimacy.  Asad and 
the regime decided that the conflict with the opposition in Hama was a “last-ditch battle” 
that, “one way or the other, would decide the fate of the country.”77 
 It was generally understood that the Islamist opposition had to be completely 
destroyed in Hama, regardless of the moral and human cost of such an operation.  The 
interesting aspect of this conflict is that it was not only a conflict between the regime and 
the opposition; it also boiled down to a religious conflict, as well a massive struggle for 
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regime legitimacy.  According to opposition discourse, Hama was ‘invaded’ by over 
12,000 regime troops in the attempt to hunt down and destroy the opposition.  The 
brutality employed by the regime was astounding; entire families were dragged into the 
streets and murdered, and numerous mosques, churches, and monuments were looted and 
destroyed.  A telling statistic of the conflict is that the casualty estimates range from 
3,000 (the number provided by government supporters) to some 20,000 (the number 
reported by government critics).78   
Another explanation for the potency of the uprising in Hama falls along socio-
economic lines. While it was, without a doubt, an event tainted with religious opposition, 
economic decisions made by the regime in 1981 had a significant impact on who became 
involved in the uprising. Fred Lawson asserts that as an increasingly larger percentage of 
Syria’s cotton was pulled away from local industries toward the larger, state-run factories 
and export markets, the regime, specifically Prime Minister ‘Abd al-Ra’uf al-Kasm, was 
forced to implement new policies to benefit smaller businesses, but ultimately, local 
artisans were forced to bear the brunt of the price for these new policies under a new tax 
system.79 Coincidentally or not, a majority of these artisans were Muslim, and perhaps 
motivated by Islamic ideals of fairness in economic dealings, they developed close ties 
with one another, as they began to oppose state coalitions and other industrial institutions 
they felt were treating them unfairly.80 
In an attempt to appease those who saw the siege of Hama as a brutal act of 
violence carried out by a brutal regime, Asad ordered the rapid rebuilding of the city.  
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The regime spent a great deal of money in the reshaping of Hama, as new schools, 
clinics, playgrounds and shopping malls were constructed, as well as two large mosques 
and a large Catholic church to replace those destroyed in the siege. In an attempt to make 
the city less conservative than it had been before the 1982 uprising, mixed bathing was 
introduced and the first co-ed dormitory in Syria was constructed in 1983. Asad’s brutal 
response to the Islamist opposition and the drastic restructuring of Hama that occurred 
afterwards displays a desperate attempt by the regime to eliminate a major source of 
opposition, while it simultaneously attempted “not just to erase the past but to change 
attitudes” as well.81 
 Another tactic of regime survival employed by the Asad regime involved how 
Asad and his followers portrayed the events in Hama in the media.  Lisa Wedeen argues 
that the regime used “partial truth-telling” to paint a more acceptable picture of how the 
regime handled the bloody conflict.  The rhetorical strategies employed by the regime 
established “both the authority of the Ba‘th and its victimization at the hands of the 
enemy.”82  The regime painted the Islamist opposition as cowards who shot from the 
doors of mosques, and went as far as to define the Ba‘th forces as “knights,” stating that 
they acted with “national and revolutionary spirit.”  Various claims were made that the 
Muslim Brethren had sold themselves to the devil and that they “brutally killed all the 
citizens” who would not welcome them into their homes.83  According to Wedeen, the 
regime’s ability to “wax and wane” made it possible for Asad to be both the 
“omnipresent leader in charge of events that unify and bring glory to Syrians” and 
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“absent from and innocent of events that are embarrassing or simply conflictual.”84  A 
short time after the events in February, Asad was supposedly acclaimed by over a million 
Syrians, and he subsequently condemned the violence of the Muslim Brethren, and 
warned Syrians to be wary of those who may appear to be, but are not, true Muslims. 
 The presentation of Asad as the ‘omnipresent’ leader was not limited to the events 
of Hama and the actions of the Muslim Brethren.  Wedeen argues that the regime 
preferred compliance over legitimacy, and essentially sought compliance through a 
variety of authoritarian and controlling means. The Syrian constitution does not contain 
any provision that could possibly override the president’s power, but the semblance of a 
system of political participation paints a picture more resembling democratic principles 
than its actual authoritarian nature. Further, the symbolic displays of power utilized by 
Asad’s regime were intended to generate obedience.  These practices included 
compulsory attendance at state spectacles, and other tactics “beyond the barrel of the gun 
and the confines of the torture chamber.”85  According to Wedeen, Asad’s regime 
employed six specific tactics in its attempt to consolidate power and ensure domestic 
legitimacy; first, the regime produced “guidelines for acceptable speech and behavior”; 
second, it defined “a specific type of national membership”; third, it occasioned “the 
enforcement of obedience”; fourth, it induced complicity “by creating practices in which 
citizens are themselves ‘accomplices,’ ” who upheld the norms of Asad’s domination; 
fifth it isolated Syrians from each other; and sixth, it cluttered public space with 
“monotonous slogans and empty gestures.”86  All of these tactics were attempts to create 
internal legitimacy.  Essentially, the regime did not really care if Syrians believed in all 
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of the mystifications and praise of Asad; they were only required to behave as if they did, 
as the Syrian regime pursued “symbolic strategies” which were intended “not to induce 
charisma or belief, but rather to elicit outward signs of obedience.”87 
 
Conclusion 
The referendum that ushered in the Bashar era of Syrian politics, though disputed, 
can very easily be seen as the first noncoup transition of power in Syria since 1949.  
During that span, Syria had undergone some seventeen coups, the last of which 
culminated in Hafiz al-Asad’s seizure of complete power in 1970. Even then, when 
questions arose about his health, his brother Rif‘at expressed a real interest in carrying 
out a coup of his own and seizing power for himself.  The question that arises is what do 
these coups, and the significant number of them, tell us about the nature of 
authoritarianism in Syria? In fact, they point to the existence of a fairly weak state, one in 
which various initially fairly small groups are able to seize power relatively quickly, due 
to personal alliances and external pressures, as long as they have the support of a 
somewhat significant faction of the armed forces. The ‘Corrective Movement’ of 1970 is 
remarkable in its own right, as it established a regime that is still largely intact, although 
some of the faces may have changed.  
What this analysis of the various military coups hopes to have shown is that the 
legacies of French colonial policy, and the destruction of pre-Mandate Syrian social and 
political structures, in which new alliances were formed, principally between the French 
and various ‘friendly’ minorities, led to a state of affairs ripe for constant military 
intervention.  Only after 1970 was an authoritarian ruler able to consolidate complete 
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control over the armed forces, essentially eliminating any threat from within the regime, 
but Asad still had to contend with internal opposition. However, the sheer brutality of the 
response to the uprising in Hama leads one to believe that the Syrian regime no longer 
had anything to fear on the domestic front by the early 1980s. It effectively eliminated 
Islamist opposition to ‘Alawi rule, which by that time was so entrenched in the military 
wing of the regime that supplanting it would prove extremely difficult. The cult of 
personality constructed around Hafiz was a spectacle to behold, and as he proved with his 
handing of the aftermath of the events of Hama, he was a rather creative and adaptive 
leader.  
Asad’s predecessors, like himself, were often power-hungry military officers, who 
whether they would admit it or not, were driven by a personal desire to lead Syria ‘in a 
new direction.’ Often, their ambitions were quickly quashed as they were ousted and 
replaced by coups, sometimes led by the very officers who had put them in their position. 
Some parliaments only lasted twelve hours, as seen with Shishkali’s successive coups 
first against Hinnawi and then against the parliament established by the civilian 
government he had allowed to remain. Perhaps the most interesting case of authoritarian 
rule experienced by Syria during this period came during its ill-fated union with Nasser 
and Egypt. Enticed by Nasser’s pan-Arabist rhetoric, and motivated by fear of the 
influence of communism, Syria’s Ba‘th party effectively pushed for its own dismissal. 
According to ‘Aflaq, the party does not seem to have been fully aware of the extent to 
which it would be required to subordinate itself to the new regime: “We [the Ba‘th Party] 
will be officially dissolved but we will be present in the new unified party, the National 
 89 
Union. Born of the union of two countries, this movement cannot be inspired by 
principles other than those of the Ba‘th.”88   
What was present in the union, however, was a noticeable domination by 
Egyptian officers and politicians, and of course Nasser was president. Rather than do 
away with the subordinating style of government engendered by the UAR, the postunion 
government essentially adopted much of the same structure as it pushed for more 
integration of the private sphere, only to see the Ba‘th party exploit these same structures 
as it took power, first in 1963, and ultimately in the hands of the Asads after 1970. 
Throughout the thirty years of his rule, Hafiz proved extremely capable of handling both 
internal and external pressures, and used Syria’s historic and politically strategic location 
to his utmost advantage. Though it would not have been entirely impossible without the 
drastic reordering of Syrian society and politics which had taken place under French 
‘tutelage,’ a careful analysis of post-Mandate Syria indicates that the relative ease with 
which governments were supplanted and power was taken owes a great deal to what 
happened between 1920 and 1946. 
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CONCLUSION: A HISTORICAL PATTERN? 
 
 
Indeed, Hourani’s reservations about dividing history into convenient periods are 
well warranted. There is no sense in which Syrian history from the Mandate to the Asads 
can be regarded as a single ‘era.’ Comparing the policies enacted by the French in 
response to growing discord with the Asad regime’s unwillingness to lift the 1963 
Emergency Law until 2011 without some explicit clarifications is a historical folly. 
Nevertheless, to understand the current state of Syrian politics, and its possible trajectory, 
it is important to look back at the broken promises and repressive ways by which the 
Allied Powers, in this case France, sought to impose their will on the ‘liberated’ states of 
the former Ottoman Empire.  
In two years, Sharif Husayn of Mecca conducted ‘negotiations’ with both the 
British and the Ottoman Empire. The earlier correspondence between Husayn and the 
Ottoman officials Enver and Jamal Pasha should at least cast serious doubt on the 
‘traditional’ Arab nationalist notion that the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were 
struggling with all their might against the repressive Ottoman yoke. Shortly after 
pledging assistance to the Ottomans, and learning that money and weapons were on their 
way, Husayn made similar promises to Sir Henry McMahon and the British. Far from 




position and prominence were not threatened in Arabia, and to extend this influence as 
far as possible.  
The attention paid to the correspondence with Istanbul, however, pales in 
comparison to the scrutiny leveled at the Husayn-McMahon correspondence that 
immediately followed it. It seems that Husayn began to believe that some form of self-
rule was possible, though he responded to the initial letters with some hesitation. He 
characterized McMahon’s initial response to his request for a completely independent 
Arab state as cool and detached, noting that McMahon had essentially avoided the idea 
altogether. However, by the time the correspondence had ceased, he seemed convinced of 
impending independence. But, as we have seen, the correspondence was virtually 
meaningless. The French and British had secretly devised a plan for dividing up the 
former Ottoman provinces, relegating specific regions to zones of ‘influence’ and ‘direct 
control,’ further stipulating that Palestine be placed under international supervision. The 
idea that an Ottoman collapse could allow Russia or Germany to gather a significant 
foothold in the former Ottoman provinces was a particularly unwelcome to both Britain 
and France.  Thus both countries set about ensuring they would somehow control the 
future of the ‘power vacuum’ that would likely emerge after the Ottoman collapse. 
Though they supported different groups and had vested interests in different regions, both 
France and Britain wanted the Middle East. Despite its importance in ensuring that both 
parties would see their fears quelled and their aspirations realized, the Sykes-Picot 
agreement was disregarded, as were most of the prewar secret bargains.  
One of the most damaging actions by the League of Nations after the war was its 




conducted was hardly ‘scientific’, it was clear that a French Mandate was just about the 
last thing the people of Syria wished to see imposed upon them, and the number of those 
opposed to French rule number would likely have been even higher had they been able to 
see into the future and realize they were to be subjugated to military rule and martial law 
for much of the next twenty-five years. Again, let us return to Philip Khoury and his 
characterization of the problem of administering a country against the will of its 
inhabitants: “A small but tenacious group of Frenchmen…capitalized on the ‘defensive 
patriotism’ wrought by World War I to commit France to the military occupation of Syria 
in 1920. But, seizing Syria by force was one thing; governing the country was quite 
another.”1 
 From the outset, those who carried out French policy in Syria saw their task as a 
benevolent civilizing mission. General Gouraud, who marched on Damascus in 1920 to 
impose the French Mandate, claimed Syria as one of France’s ‘many children,’ and 
vowed to uphold the sacred mission outlined by the League of Nations. It is also 
interesting to examine the language of the various treaties and proclamations, taking note 
of the various ways in which it was implied that European society was clearly superior to 
Arab society, despite the region’s rich cultural history.2  
 What kind of connections are there between the practices of the Mandate 
authorities and the state of Syrian politics in the latter half of the twentieth century? It is 
may be somewhat dubious to make such broad connections, but nonetheless they do 
exist. As has been shown, the ‘Alawite predominance in the ranks of the Syrian military n 
be traced somewhat to French policies of enlisting the help of ‘friendly’ minorities, but 
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this is by no means the only reason.3 Batatu’s detailed analysis shows that much of the 
‘Alawi domination of the military can be traced to their ‘dominance’ of the lower ranks 
of the military; they were never really in control until the 1960s, but the chaos and 
personal rivalries common to the higher ranking officers, provided Asad and his fellow 
junior officers with the opportunity they needed. Over time, however, the French grew 
increasingly wary of Sunni dominance in the country, and ultimately thought it best to 
have the more marginalized sections of Syrian society as its closest allies. As can be seen 
in the Great Syrian Revolt led by the Druze of Jabal Hawran, this policy also often led to 
fierce rivalries within these minority groups, thus further splintering French support.  
It took the French authorities much longer than their British counterparts in Iraq 
to realize that direct control was perhaps not the best course of action. By the end of the 
1920s, there was already a clear timetable for British withdrawal4 but in Syria at the same 
time military rule and martial law characterized the political arena. Writing in 1917, Sir 
Arthur Hirtzel of the India Office in London expressed a sentiment familiar to officials of 
the time:  
The Turkish menace has apparently been removed. But another has taken its 
place, of a different kind, and one which, I think, makes it imperative for us to get 
to work. What I mean is that we must at least consider the possibility of a peace 
which will not give us the absolute political control of Mesopotamia that we 
should like to have.5 
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Demands made by the leaders of the revolt made their demands clear from the onset of 
the fighting; they wanted to determine their own future, and would accept the French 
only if they were relegated to a purely advisory role. These demands were utterly 
unacceptable to the French. 
 Thus, the opposition to French rule and the resultant actions taken by the Mandate 
authorities created an uncertain future for Syria. Attempting to find any direct 
connections between French rule and the frequency of coups in post-independence Syria 
would lead to a gross oversimplification of history. However, it is possible to find the 
legacies of the military rule that characterized the latter years of the Mandate in this 
period. Immediately after the departure of the French, there was virtually no military 
organization, and the French policy of recruiting almost exclusively among Syria’s many 
diverse ethnic and cultural groups led to fierce battles for power among the emerging 
upper echelons.  
The predominance of the ‘Alawis, which, as Batatu has shown, did not emerge 
until well into the 1960s, can trace its roots to this period as well, as the new Syrian 
governments continued the process of heavily subsidizing military education, allowing 
Syrians from the rural areas to enter Syria’s newly formed military academies. These 
regions, which also happened to be inhabited by families unlikely to be able to send their 
sons abroad for their education, proved to be the origins of a great deal of Syria’s military 
elite, and at the very least provided a commonality among those who would soon become 
junior officers. Thus, by the end of the 1940s, Syria was well on the way to a chaotic 
state of affairs that would only be somewhat stabilized under the dictatorial rule of Hafiz 




remain in power for a significant amount of time, from 1970 to his death by natural 
causes in 2000. In spite of the length of time he remained in power, no stable institutions 
seem to have been created, and, in time, his son has inherited the harvest of the seething 
discontents brought on by his own and his father’s dictatorial rule. Throughout the 1940s 
and 1950s, chaos was the rule of law, as military governments replaced military 
governments, and civilian governments, when created, often did not last very long.  
 Ultimately, the end of the political chaos engendered by the illiberal and top-
heavy practices of the Mandate came in the personage of Hafiz al-Asad. His prowess at 
building a loyal following, suppressing rebellion, and creating a substantial ‘cult of 
personality’ is remarkable. Though he surely faced challenges to his rule, even from his 
own brother, he clung to power and responded to the challenges with a degree of 
calculated brutality to an extent unparalleled in the modern history of Syria. He ordered 
the shelling of Hama, which destroyed a major portion of the city, yet was able to couch 
the action in terms placing the blame entirely upon his opposition. His intense 
intelligence network and strong, if largely ineffectual role, as the ‘defender’ of the 
Palestinians also allowed him to proceed virtually without any obstacles in his path. 
Though it is never the job of a historian to attempt to predict the future, it can be asserted 
that the state of modern Syria would most likely be quite different had the French 
pursued a policy more in-line with the desires of Syrians, which had been clearly laid out 
by the middle of the 1920s. Instead of listening, they sought to entrench themselves 
further, much as the Asad regimes have done, to the point that virtually no change was 
possible without total restructuring, which would itself require input from an opposition 




as it became apparent that France could not hold on to power indefinitely, the situation in 
Syria became transformed into a drawn out episode of military rule and martial law that 
created a political environment ripe for the authoritarian rule that has characterized Syria 
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